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SPECIAL REPORT

**2025 FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SECURITY
ASSESSMENT MISSION (CFSAM) TO THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

19 March 2026

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ABBREVIATIONS

AEA	agriculture extension assistant
AFI	Acute Food Insecurity
AFIS	Agriculture and Food Information System
BCS	body condition scoring
BSS	Bank of South Sudan
BQ	black quarter
CBPP	contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
CBT	cash-based transfers
CCPP	contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
CCMC	County Crop Monitoring Committee
CFSAM	Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
ECF	East Coast fever
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAW	fall armyworm
FCS	food consumption score
FES	food expenditure share
FMD	foot-and-mouth disease
FSNMS+	Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System - Plus
FY	fiscal year
GDP	gross domestic product
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture
HFA	humanitarian food assistance
HNO	humanitarian needs overview
HS	haemorrhagic septicaemia
IDP	internally displaced person
INGO	international non-governmental organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JMMI	Joint Market Monitoring Initiative
LCSI	livelihood-based coping strategy index
MLF	Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries (National Ministry)
MARF&T	Ministry of Animal Resources, Fisheries and Tourism (State Ministry)
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoAFS	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NDVI	Normalized Difference Vegetation Index
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PET	Pictorial Evaluation Tool (Crop yield and livestock condition photo indicators)

POC	protection of civilians
PPR	peste des petits ruminants
QQU	<i>Quelea quelea</i> birds
rCSI	reduced coping strategy index
RFE	rainfall estimate
SMoA	State Ministry of Agriculture
SSP	South Sudanese pound
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
US/EIA	United States/Energy Information Administration
USD	United States dollar
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme

HIGHLIGHTS

- The 2025 net cereal production in the traditional smallholder sector, after standardized deduction of post-harvest losses and seed use, is estimated at about 1 213 100 tonnes, 8 percent higher than the 2024 output and 27 percent above the average of the previous five years.
- The cereal harvested area in 2025 is estimated at 1 258 900 hectares, about 7 percent higher than in 2024 and 17 percent above the average of the previous five years. The expansion reflects an increase in the number of farming households, as returnees, mainly from the Sudan, engaged in agriculture alongside a significant number of urban households that participated in farming in nearby rural areas as a secondary source of income, encouraged by high food prices.
- The average cereal yield in 2025 is estimated at 1.2 tonnes/hectare, similar to 2024 and about 10 percent above the average of the previous five years, reflecting generally favourable weather conditions and limited flood-related damage to standing crops.
- With a projected population of about 13.88 million in mid-2026, the overall cereal production deficit in the 2026 marketing year (January/December) is estimated at 317 300 tonnes, about 9 percent lower than the 2025 deficit and 28 percent below the average deficit over the 2021–2025 period.
- In 2025, pests and diseases had a limited impact on crop production, apart from localized losses in some areas in Upper Nile State and in the Greater Kapoeta Region caused by *Quelea Quelea* (QQU) birds. By contrast, various weed species continued to significantly constrain yields across the country.



- The availability of pasture and water for livestock was generally adequate in 2025, contributing to better animal body conditions.
- Prices of sorghum, maize and wheat continued in 2025 to follow a sustained upward trend that began in early 2024, triggered by the abrupt depreciation of the national currency. By November 2025, prices had risen to nearly three times their already elevated year-earlier levels.
- According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis¹ published in November 2025, 7.55 million people (about 53 percent of the population) were projected to face IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or higher levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season from April to July 2026.
- This figure includes about 2.3 million people expected to be in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) across all states of the country and about 28 000 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), located in Jonglei and Upper Nile states.
- Acute food insecurity continues to be driven by multiple, often overlapping, factors,

including macroeconomic shocks such as high inflation and currency depreciation, extreme weather events (floods and dry spells), localized insecurity due to subnational violence, internal population displacement, and conflict-related shocks in neighbouring countries that continue to drive new arrivals of returnees and refugees, disrupting supply chains and markets, and resulting in reduced remittances.

- Limited access to basic services and the cumulative effects of prolonged years of asset

depletion continue to erode households' coping capacities, further exacerbating food insecurity and malnutrition.

- South Sudan faces a rapidly worsening nutrition crisis. Between July 2025 and June 2026, over 3.2 million people, including 2.11 million children under five and 1.15 million pregnant and breastfeeding women, are likely to suffer from acute malnutrition, with conflict-related service disruptions, cholera outbreaks and deepening food insecurity pushing several counties toward IPC AMN Phase 5 (Extremely Critical).

OVERVIEW

A Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) was conducted from 2 to 16 December 2025 to estimate the cereal production during 2025 and assess the overall food security situation in the country. The CFSAM reviewed the findings of 20 crop assessment missions conducted at planting and harvesting time from July to November 2025 in different agroecological zones of the country. All missions were carried out by a crop assessment Task Force Team that comprised staff from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS), the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the respective State Ministries of Agriculture, Environment and Forestry (SMAEF). Task Force Team members were trained to conduct rapid assessments using established CFSAM instruments, protocols and techniques, including walking transects, scoring of standing crops and livestock body conditions using the Pictorial Evaluation Tool (PET),ⁱⁱ crop cuttings, interviews with key informants and farmer case studies.

Since 2016, 64 County Crop Monitoring Committees (CCMCs) have been established across the country with the aim to improve the local capacity to collect reliable and accurate data. The European Union and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, through the FAO Representation in Juba, have financially supported the assessments, the establishment of the CCMCs and several training activities. Insecurity still prevailing in some areas has impeded the full execution of the initial assessment plan, with field activities carried out only in accessible areas of the ten states and three Administrative Areas. Access by Task Force teams has been precluded in parts of Unity, Jonglei, Upper Nile, Western Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria states. In addition, in all visited areas, concerns over security precluded conducting driving transects and yield assessments



were mainly performed through walking transects and crop cuttings (sampling). The assessment teams carried out 20 planting and harvest assessment missions, visiting 44 counties, between July and November 2025. The teams conducted almost 2 500 interviews with farmers, 65 interviews with key informants, including senior staff of State Ministries of Agriculture, Environment and Forestry (SMAEF), county officials and staff of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in the field and 34 focus group discussions.

Using standard CFSAM procedures, the Task Force teams reviewed secondary sources of information regarding the main factors that affected crop performance during the 2025 agricultural season, estimated the aggregate national cereal production and assessed the overall food security situation. In areas where access was too dangerous due to high levels of insecurity, telephone interviews with key informants were carried out to obtain information about crop performance. In addition, in insecure areas not accessible by the Task Force teams, data and information have been collected by CCMCs.

Since the signature of the R-ARCSS in October 2018, the overall security situation has gradually improved

and about 1.54 million refugees from Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya have returned to the country in a self-organized manner, between end-2018 and 2024. In 2025, the security situation remained broadly stable in most areas of the country. However, 479 000 individuals were displaced by episodes of episodes of intercommunal violence in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity and Western Bahr el Ghazal states as well as in the Greater Equatoria Region, while 376 000 South Sudanese were displaced by floods. Although these events had only a marginal impact on the national aggregate crop production, they significantly affected food security conditions at local level.

As of end-December 2025, about 1.32 million people were reported to have fled from the Sudan to South Sudan following the conflict that erupted in the Sudan in mid-April 2023. About 67 percent of the arrivals are South Sudanese returnees and the rest are Sudanese refugees.

In 2025, the aggregate cereal harvested area in the traditional farming sector is estimated at about 1.26 million hectares, over 7 percent above the 2024 level and almost 17 percent above the 2020–2024 average. The year-on-year increase is mainly due to a 5.8 percent growth in the number of farming households, as returnees, predominantly from the Sudan, engaged in agriculture alongside a substantial number of urban households, which participated in farming in nearby rural areas as a secondary source of income, encouraged by high food prices.

The 2025 net cereal production from the traditional sector, after deduction of standardized post-harvest losses and seed use, is estimated at about 1.21 million tonnes, 8 percent above the 2024 output and 27 percent above the average of the previous five years. The year-on-year increase in production is mainly attributed to the increase in harvested area as yields were similar to the previous year and over 10 percent above the average of the previous five years, due to generally favourable weather conditions and limited flood-related damage to standing crops. As in recent years, floods were widespread in 2025, but they occurred late in the season, when crops were already mature and less vulnerable to flood damage.

In 2025, pests and diseases had a limited impact on crop performance, apart from localized losses in some areas in Upper Nile State and in the Greater Kapoeta Region caused by QQU birds. By contrast, different species of weeds continued to significantly constrain yields across the country.

With a mid-2026 projected population of about 13.88 million people, consuming on average 110 kg of cereals/capita/year, cereal requirements are estimated at about 1.53 million tonnes, leaving a deficit of about 317 300 tonnes of cereals in the traditional sector during the 2026 marketing year (January/December), about 9 percent below the 2025 deficit and nearly 28 percent below the 2021–2025 average. Despite the year-on-year decline, the cereal deficit remains substantial, representing about 20 percent of the estimated cereal requirements.

The protracted depreciation of the national currency accelerated in February 2024, when oil exports and revenues plunged due to damages to the pipelines passing through the Sudan. In April 2025, exports resumed and the exchange rate firmed up, remaining mostly stable until November 2025, when on the parallel market it was about SSP 5 700/USD 1 compared with about SSP 4 900/USD 1, one year earlier.

Prices of sorghum, maize and wheat, the main cereal staples, continued in 2025 the sustained upward trend which began in early 2024. By November 2025, prices were nearly three times their already elevated year-earlier levels, constraining food access for large segments of the population.

In 2024, the Gross domestic product (GDP) plunged by 26 percent due to the sharp reduction in oil production, recovering by 24 percent in 2025 following the resumption of oil exports.

According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis, published in November 2025, nearly about 7.55 million people (about 53 percent of the population) are projected to face IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or higher levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season between April and July 2026. Over the same period, about 2.3 million people are expected to be in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency),

and about 28 000 people are projected to face IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) levels of food insecurity.

South Sudan is projected to face a severe nutrition crisis between July 2025 and June 2026, with 2.11 million children under five and 1.15 million pregnant and breastfeeding women expected to suffer from acute malnutrition. Most cases, about 70 percent, will occur in Jonglei, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Unity and Warrap states.

Malnutrition levels are anticipated to worsen in 46 counties during the October 2025–March 2026

period, with 20 counties likely moving into more critical IPC AMN phases. By the April–June 2026 lean season, five counties and the Abyei Administrative Area are projected to deteriorate to IPC AMN Phase 5 (Extremely Critical) due to conflict-related service disruptions, a worsening cholera outbreak and widening food gaps.

The crisis is driven by poor food consumption, high disease burden, suboptimal feeding practices, and limited access to safe water and sanitation, all worsened by widespread food insecurity.



SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT

Population and population movements

The national population in 2025 was estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) at 13.34 million people.^a Since the conflict started in December 2013, the population size and its geographical distribution have undergone significant changes.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as of December 2025, about 5 million people had been forced to flee their homes due to insecurity since the outbreak of the civil conflict in 2023, including 2.6 million Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 2.4 million people that fled into neighbouring countries (Uganda, the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Kenya).

Since the signature of the R-ARCSS in October 2018, the overall security situation has gradually improved and about 1.54 million refugees from Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya have returned to the country in a self-organized manner, between end-2018 and 2024. In 2025, the security situation remained broadly stable in most areas of the country. However, about 479 000 people were displaced by episodes of violence in some areas of Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity, Western Bahr el Ghazal states and in the Greater Equatoria Region, while about 376 000 people were internally displaced by floods.

Another substantial population movement has been caused by the war which erupted in the Sudan in mid-April 2023 and, as of end-December 2025, about 1.32 million people were reported to have moved from the Sudan to South Sudan to flee the conflict. About 67 percent of the arrivals




were South Sudanese returnees and the rest were Sudanese refugees.

Economy

Oil production plays a primary role in the country's economy, contributing to about 60 percent of the GDP, 95 percent of exports, 90 percent of government revenues and a significant share of private sector employment. The domestic oil sector is closely linked to the Sudan, where processing facilities, pipelines, export terminals and refineries are located. Since independence in 2011, oil production has steadily declined and has experienced frequent disruptions due to disputes with the Sudan and to the civil war. As estimated 350 000 barrels/day before independence, oil extraction was interrupted in January 2012, due to a dispute with the Sudan over transit fees and transfers. Production resumed in April 2013, but it never fully recovered, remaining stagnant until February 2024, when one of the pipelines passing through the Sudan, accounting for about 70 percent of the total oil flows, broke down and could not be immediately repaired due to the ongoing conflict. The ongoing war in the Sudan affected domestic oil

^a The 2025 population figure is based on the NBS estimate, which includes returnees, mainly from the Sudan, in 2023 and 2024. Returnees in 2025 were not included, as most of them likely missed the planting window.

Figure 1. Juba – Market exchange rates in commercial and parallel markets (SSP/USD)



Source: Author's own elaboration based on data from the World Food Programme (WFP) South Sudan. WFP. 2025. *South Sudan - exchange rates*. [Cited December 2025]. <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/eastern-africa/south-sudan/economic/exchange-rates>.

production also by constraining imports of key inputs, including chemicals and spare parts. As a result of these factors, compounded by trade disruptions in the Red Sea linked to the ongoing security crisis affecting commercial shipping, production and exports of oil plunged to about one-third of their level in early 2024. Oil exports resumed in April 2025 following repairs to the pipelines, but armed attacks in May and August 2025 on key Sudanese transit points for South Sudanese oil, including infrastructure in Port Sudan, raised uncertainty over the stability of oil flows through the Sudan.

The decline in oil exports in 2024 and 2025 resulted in a deterioration of the trade balance, leading to a significant depreciation of the exchange rate of the South Sudanese pound.

The South Sudanese pound began to lose value in mid-2022, when fiscal pressures led the government to monetize the deficit by increasing money supply and spikes of international prices of several imported commodities, following the start of the conflict in Ukraine, increased traders' demand of United States dollars. The depreciation continued in 2023 and abruptly accelerated in March 2024, when oil exports and revenues plunged, continuing at sustained rates

until April 2025, when exports resumed. Between March 2024 and April 2025, the South Sudanese pound lost more than 70 percent of its value. In April 2025, the exchange rate firmed up, remaining mostly stable until November 2025, when USD 1 was sold at SSP 5 700 on the parallel market and at about SSP 4 600 on the official market, compared with about SSP 4 900 and about SSP 3 400, respectively, one year earlier.

According to International Monetary Fund (IMF),ⁱⁱⁱ the GDP plunged by 26 percent in 2024 due to the sharp reduction in oil production, recovering by 24 percent in 2025 following the resumption of oil exports.

Agriculture

The country is endowed with a diverse ecology, with the crop growing season ranging from 280 to 300 days/year in southwestern areas, known as Greenbelt, to 130 to 150 days/year in northern states. *Bimodal* rainfall areas cover most of the Greater Equatoria Region (Western, Central and parts of Eastern Equatoria), while the rest of the country has a *unimodal* rainfall regime. Agricultural performance varies markedly depending on latitude and longitude, with the possibility of two or three harvests per year from the same plots in the Greater Equatoria

Region and a single harvest in central and northern *unimodal* rainfall areas. As agriculture is almost entirely dependent on rainfall, its variability in terms of amount and distribution is usually the major factor determining the country's crop production. Cumulative seasonal rainfall amounts generally increase from northeast to southwest, culminating in the Greenbelt along the border with the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. However, there are considerable variations in rainfall from year-to-year and from location-to-location within the same year. In low-lying areas, flooding and waterlogging are a common occurrence, while prolonged dry spells are frequent in southeastern areas and along the border with the Sudan.

Crop production is mainly conducted by smallholder farmers on small plots of land cultivated manually using hand tools. The average family size is five to seven persons. Despite an abundance of arable land throughout the country, the extent of the cultivated area is limited mainly by (a) the size of the household labour force and/or the ability of the households to provide cash or in-kind payment (essentially food/local beer) for the mobilization of traditional working groups (*nafeer*), as well as labour hiring through cash payment by some better-off farmers; (b) the limited availability of efficient tools and power for land clearing and ploughing; and (c) a volatile security situation constraining access to fields.

The adoption of animal traction has been expanding throughout the country in recent years, particularly in Lakes and parts of Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states. However, the high cost of moldboard ploughs and the low skills of farmers to maintain and operate them, the lack of spare parts, the low availability of raw materials for local blacksmiths and the high prices of hand tools, continue to limit area expansion. In addition, after the escalation of the conflict in 2016, the average farm size in insecure areas has either decreased or remained stagnant due to farmers' fears of accessing far fields.

Despite gradual improvements of the security situation during the past eight years, the secure access to land,

both near homesteads and far fields, has been a critical issue, mainly in the Greater Upper Nile Region and its bordering areas, the epicentre of the conflict, as well as in some areas of the Greater Equatoria Region, where the civil war spread in 2016, resulting in the displacement of several farming households.

Large-scale mechanized cereal production is practiced in Renk and Melut counties of Upper Nile State, following the patterns of land use established before the country's independence in 2011 by local traders and farmers. Small activities of commercial farming are also practiced in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, including the Aweil Rice Scheme and some private commercial farming, mainly producing sorghum. Recently, emerging commercial farms have been reported in Western Equatoria, using own and rented tractors.

The term "*mechanization*" applies only to a one-pass ploughing and a second sowing pass with a seed drill positioned over the ubiquitous disc harrows, while other operations are performed manually. Elsewhere, limited numbers of both private and government-owned tractors provide ploughing services to individuals and farmer groups. However, tractor services face major problems related to the supply and high cost of fuel and spare parts, severely limiting their efficiency. These constraints have resulted in an increase of tractor hiring rates, and tractor services have become unaffordable for most small holder farmers.

The main cereal crop cultivated in both smallholder and mechanized sectors is sorghum, accounting for about 64 percent of the area sown to cereals in 2025. The preferred sorghum varieties are local landraces with lengths of the crop cycle fitting local agroecological characteristics^b ranging from short-season (<90 days) to very long-season (>220 days) types. There are also several improved, short-cycle varieties of sorghum from the Sudan that have become well established in both large-scale mechanized farms and traditional smallholder farming areas with cross-border access to the Sudan.^c

^b Short-season landraces provide an early harvest in August/September, while long-season landraces, able to withstand both dry spells and waterlogging, are harvested in December/January.

^c *Arfa Gadameck, Wad Ahmed, Gaddam el Hamam.*

Maize is the second dominant cereal crop in the traditional sector, accounting for about 26 percent of the total area cultivated with cereals in 2025. However, this percentage varied during the past years, with significant regional differences. Maize is the most popular cereal in the Greenbelt area, where the extended rainy season allows Longi varieties (especially Longi-5) introduced from Uganda, to produce two harvests per year on the same land. Maize is also the main cereal crop in southern and central parts of Unity State, along the Sobat River in Upper Nile State and in eastern counties of Jonglei State near the Ethiopian border, where mixed Longi varieties, local landraces and Ethiopian varieties are grown. Elsewhere, maize is cultivated in very limited areas close to homesteads, where soil fertility benefits from the availability of animal manure, and it is consumed green with the first early sorghums in August–September.

Other cereals, millet and rice, are estimated to account for about 10 percent of the cereal area in the traditional sector. Regarding rice, the cultivation of upland rice has increased in Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria states, where farmers grow it as a sole crop, and in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, where farmers have started growing both paddy and upland rice in most counties. Other crops of major importance to food security include groundnuts, cassava, sweet potatoes and yams. Area planted with groundnuts and cassava in 2025 is estimated to account for 19.5 and 8 percent, respectively, of all crops grown in the country, but the importance of these crops varies across the country. Cassava is estimated to account for 18 percent of the planted area in Western Equatoria State, 21 percent in Central Equatoria State, 8 percent in Western Bahr el Ghazal and 7 percent in Eastern Equatoria State. Groundnuts are estimated to account for 31 percent of the planted area in Lakes State, 29 percent in Western Bahr el Ghazal State, 25 percent in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, 16 percent in Central Equatoria State, 21 percent in Warrap State and Western Equatoria states, and 9 percent in Eastern Equatoria State. After cereals, groundnuts, mainly Red Beauty and Mr. Lake varieties, are the most important contribution to households' diets in these areas, where they are also the main cash crop.

Sesame is grown in almost all states, especially in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region, traditionally

intercropped with sorghum. Other sesame growing areas are in Warrap, Western Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria states. At the national level, sesame accounts for about 5 percent of the total cropped area. Cultivation of sesame has been increasing until 2022 in northern areas, especially in the commercial farming areas of Upper Nile, where it was sold at high, profitable prices to traders from the Sudan. However, production of sesame has recorded wide fluctuations due to the vulnerability of the crop to attacks by pests and its demand has decreased following the outbreak of the conflict in the Sudan in April 2023.

Okra, cowpea, green-gram, pumpkin, Bambara nut and tobacco are also widely grown around homesteads throughout the country. Vegetables, including onions and tomatoes, are increasingly cultivated near the cities to supply urban markets.

Most farmers use their own seed retained from the previous year's harvest or local seeds purchased from markets or borrowed from relatives. However, seed assistance programmes implemented by FAO and NGOs support vulnerable farming households.

Modern agricultural inputs, including chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, are not used by smallholder farmers on field crops. However, some use of herbicides has been reported in large-scale mechanized farms in Upper Nile State, which have access to supplies from bordering areas with the Sudan. The use of pesticides is limited to commercial farms of Upper Nile State on sesame and in few medium-scale vegetable farms in Central Equatoria State.

Livestock is a very important asset throughout the country, with a large proportion of the population depending on it for its livelihood. Livestock has a significant socioeconomic importance in addition to its role in food security and income generation. The main species include cattle, goats and sheep, which are raised extensively under transhumant management systems. The sale of livestock, especially small ruminants, provides a significant contribution to households' income and, therefore, to the food security of both transhumant pastoralists and sedentary livestock farmers.

CEREAL PRODUCTION IN 2025

Cereal harvested area and yield estimates

The following methodology outlines how cereal production estimates are derived in the absence of any nationally-generated crop yield estimates and empirical data from annual cropped land surveys disaggregated by crop.

Cereal production for the smallholder subsector is assessed by the CFSAM using estimates of the following variables: 1) the number of households actively farming in each county, based on: a) total county population figures and b) average household size and estimated proportion of households farming per county, reflecting the proportion of rural to urban dwellers and access to land; 2) standard estimates of the average area per farming household under cereals for each county, adjusted according to Global Positioning System (GPS) measurement results performed during the field visits; 3) estimates of average cereal yield for each county, based on:

- Farming households' case studies by the Task Force teams.
- Crop-cut samples by the Task Force teams and CCMCs.
- Mission transect observations made using PET photograph indicators and associated protocols.
- Information from semi-structured interviews with farmers, key informants from SMOA, NGOs and other partners, with focus groups.

The information collected from these sources is combined to provide the annual cereal production estimate for each county. The county figures are then added to provide cereal production estimates for each of the ten states and for the entire country.




The number of assumptions incorporated into this methodology implies that the final production figures should not be interpreted as exact figures, but rather as the best estimates under the prevailing circumstances.

Until 2013, prior to the outbreak of the civil conflict, crop production estimates were undertaken by a team of international specialists during a three-week Mission to the country in December, working with staff from MoAFS, NBS, FAO and WFP national staff. Since 2014, in a departure from the usual one-off CFSAM exercise at harvest time, several teams led by the members of a Task Force of selected specialists from MoAFS, NBS and FAO national staff conducted a series of intermediate missions at planting and harvesting time. In addition, since 2015, the FAO South Sudan Country Office recruited a Crop Assessment Supervisor/Trainer to support the capacity building efforts and year-round assessment of the main crops from planting to harvesting.


Accordingly, all missions were scheduled to match agricultural activities that occur at different times of the year in different cropping areas and agroecological zones. The effect of the change

Map 1. County Crop Monitoring Committee locations, 2025



Note: Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map.
 Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Map 2. Counties assessed by Task Force teams, 2025



Note: Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map.
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in approach was noticeable in terms of broader coverage, including a continuous monitoring of crops throughout the growing season and a more accurate assessment of crop production of both first and second season harvests in *bimodal* rainfall areas. The current approach has greatly improved the quality of the CFSAM estimates, providing more accurate agricultural data to enable informed decisions by national and international institutions.

To increase the geographic coverage of the assessment and the participation of local line agencies, the former Agriculture and Food Information System (AFIS) Project of FAO set up 39 CCMCs in 2016 and 2017, whose members were extension workers of the MoAFS and staff of NGOs. Members of CCMCs were trained to monitor and report the progress of the cropping season and to assess the performance of crops using a standard form designed to capture qualitative and quantitative information. The number of CCMCs has gradually increased and, since 2022 they were present in all states, with the support of the project “*Strengthening the resilience of pastoral and agropastoral communities in South Sudan’s cross-border areas with the Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (OSRO/SSD/703/EU)*”, funded by the European Union. The 2025 CFSAM has been technically and financially supported by the new European Union project “*South Sudan’s Green and Resilient Agriculture and Climate Economy*” (GRACE). Since 2017, the annual crop assessment exercise is based on two main pillars: the missions by the Task Force teams and the monitoring and reporting activities carried out by CCMCs. In 2025, 44 CCMCs were operative across the country.

As during past years, for all assessment missions carried out in 2025 by the Task Force teams at planting and harvesting times, security-related access constraints required field work to be conducted only in pre-selected locations reachable by air or by main roads where at least two vehicles were required to drive in tandem.

Since 2015, yield estimates in some specific locations were conducted with walking transects^d instead of long-distance driving transects. In recent years, with the increased coverage of the cropping areas assessed by the Task Force teams and the CCMCs, coupled with missions scheduled at harvesting time in diverse agroecological zones, yield estimates relied more on crop-cuttings (sampling) than on PET-based transects. However, PET-based estimates were mainly carried out in areas where crops were not fully mature or not ready for harvest during the visits of the Task Force teams and samples of immature crops would have been misleading in yield estimations due to the high moisture content of the grains.

In 2025, the Task Force teams conducted 20 planting and harvest assessment missions, visiting 44 counties between July and November 2025 in all ten states and the three Administrative Areas. Using the standard CFSAM checklist, the Task Force teams conducted about 2 500 interviews with farmers, 65 interviews with key informants, including senior staff of State Ministries of Agriculture, Environment and Forestry (SMAEF), county officials and staff of NGOs based in the field, and 34 focus group discussions, with each group consisting, on average, of 20 farmers.

Table 1. Number of CFSAM missions and studies by the Task Force, 2025

Type of mission	Number of missions	Key informant interviews	Case studies	Focus group discussions
Planting Assessment	4	10	821	6
Main Season Harvest Assessment	10	30	1 624	18
2nd Season Harvest Assessment	6	25	991	10
Total	20	65	3 436	34

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Republic of South Sudan, 2025.

^d Team members independently walk through crop fields, scoring yields in every plot/field surveyed by colour code according to “close-up level” of PET photograph indicators for each major crop. Scores are then converted from colour codes into tonnes/hectares and weighted averages calculated for each transect walked.

Growing conditions reported in case studies and interviews were then compared with remote sensing data and information from the FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS) and the WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), including Normalized Difference Vegetation Indices (NDVIs) as well as estimates of precipitation amounts and anomalies, along with rainfall data collected locally using manual rain gauges. Furthermore, in areas with severe risks to teams' safety, information has been gathered through e-mail and telephone conversations with key informants. In these cases, the contribution of CCMC networks across the country has been significant, especially by providing information on seasonal weather conditions, crop performance, occurrence of floods and pest infestations.

In 2025, the aggregate cereal harvested area in the traditional farming sector is estimated at about 1.26 million hectares, over 7 percent up from 2024 and almost 17 percent above the 2020–2024 average. The year-on-year increase is mainly due to a 5.8 percent growth in the number of farming households, as returnees, mainly from the Sudan, engaged in agriculture alongside a substantial number of urban households, which participated in farming in nearby rural areas as a secondary source of income, encouraged by high food prices.

Table 2 shows the 2025 breakdown of the harvested area at state, administrative area and country levels as well as the variables used for its calculation.

Table 2. Estimated settled population, farming households and harvested cereal area, 2025

State/Administrative Area/County	Population (mid-2025)	Households (mid-2025)	Farming households (percent)	Farming households (mid-2025)	Average cereal area (hectares/household)	Total cereal area (hectares)
Central Equatoria	1 642 927	267 966	55	147 785	0.82	120 600
Juba	555 594	87 183	36	31 386	0.85	26 678
Kajo Keji ^{1/}	247 295	40 984	65	26 639	0.78	20 779
Lainya ^{1/}	120 867	18 924	55	10 408	0.63	6 557
Morobo ^{1/}	123 315	18 698	65	12 153	1.20	14 584
Terekeka	274 656	49 093	72	35 347	0.48	16 966
Yei ^{1/}	321 201	53 085	60	31 851	1.10	35 036
Eastern Equatoria	1 196 150	199 320	75	150 295	1.04	155 634
Budi	111 380	18 832	87	16 384	1.40	22 938
Ikotos	113 566	22 165	86	19 062	1.25	23 828
Kapoeta East	180 330	32 373	58	18 777	0.68	12 768
Kapoeta North	167 023	25 881	58	15 011	0.65	9 757
Kapoeta South	108 664	16 202	52	8 425	0.65	5 476
Lafon	166 722	27 008	90	24 307	0.80	19 446
Magwi ^{1/}	281 526	43 555	85	37 022	1.43	52 941
Torit	66 938	13 303	85	11 308	0.75	8 481
Jonglei	1 833 011	256 649	44	111 973	0.63	70 829
Akobo	240 801	31 314	65	20 354	0.65	13 230
Ayod	206 235	25 003	35	8 751	0.47	4 113
Bor South	360 983	51 190	65	33 273	0.78	25 953
Duk	211 560	33 036	35	11 563	0.57	6 591
Fangak	208 944	27 647	15	4 147	0.45	1 866
Khorflus/Pigi/Canal	113 120	13 659	22	3 005	0.65	1 953
Nyirrol	151 196	21 245	35	7 436	0.44	3 272
Twic East	131 926	22 221	35	7 777	0.27	2 100
Uror	208 246	31 335	50	15 667	0.75	11 751

Table 2. Estimated settled population, farming households and harvested cereal area, 2025 (Cont.)

State/Administrative Area/County	Population (mid-2025)	Households (mid-2025)	Farming households (percent)	Farming households (mid-2025)	Average cereal area (hectares/household)	Total cereal area (hectares)
Pibor Administrative Area	326 597	50 413	53	26 681	0.78	20 710
Lakes	1 285 865	174 031	80	139 777	1.34	186 953
Awerial	148 423	23 602	70	16 522	1.37	22 635
Cueibet	194 860	28 600	90	25 740	1.30	33 463
Rumbek Centre	229 172	25 099	70	17 569	1.28	22 489
Rumbek East	185 542	23 434	84	19 685	1.32	25 984
Rumbek North	77 298	8 819	70	6 173	0.84	5 186
Wulu	94 660	15 213	90	13 691	1.70	23 275
Yirol East	170 460	22 690	82	18 606	1.20	22 327
Yirol West	185 449	26 573	82	21 790	1.45	31 595
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	993 991	185 420	78	145 451	0.77	111 530
Aweil Centre	80 752	17 532	75	13 149	1.20	15 779
Aweil East	366 583	67 275	80	53 820	0.63	33 907
Aweil North	179 094	34 524	85	29 346	0.80	23 476
Aweil South	150 879	28 725	67	19 246	0.72	13 857
Aweil West	216 683	37 363	80	29 890	0.82	24 510
Unity	994 351	117 935	37	43 416	0.45	19 698
Guit	74 280	7 273	42	3 055	0.55	1 680
Koch	104 871	11 143	55	6 129	0.50	3 064
Leer	82 549	10 966	40	4 386	0.42	1 842
Mayendit	75 256	9 246	28	2 589	0.38	984
Mayom	166 560	20 995	50	10 498	0.55	5 774
Panyijar	127 585	21 822	35	7 638	0.39	2 979
Rubkona	363 249	36 488	25	9 122	0.37	3 375
Ruweng Administrative Area^{2/}	199 978	24 119	56	13 587	0.57	7 763
Upper Nile	1 618 027	240 420	47	112 948	0.79	88 816
Baliet	25 090	3 794	56	2 125	0.87	1 847
Akoka	36 300	5 486	56	3 072	0.87	2 675
Fashoda ^{1/}	81 463	13 155	38	4 999	0.80	3 999
Longochuk	79 133	10 370	75	7 778	0.68	5 289
Luakpiny/Nasir	312 278	43 169	42	18 131	0.42	7 615
Maban	86 819	18 863	48	9 054	0.70	6 338
Maiwut	140 449	18 518	65	12 037	0.65	7 824
Malakal	207 436	27 704	24	6 649	0.48	3 192
Manyo	83 900	14 102	60	8 461	0.85	7 192
Melut	138 029	19 923	57	11 356	1.00	11 356
Panyikang	71 138	11 382	31	3 528	0.58	2 046
Renk	205 979	33 631	50	16 816	1.40	23 542
Ulang	150 013	20 322	44	8 942	0.66	5 902

Table 2. Estimated settled population, farming households and harvested cereal area, 2025 (Cont.)

State/Administrative Area/County	Population (mid-2025)	Households (mid-2025)	Farming households (percent)	Farming households (mid-2025)	Average cereal area (hectares/household)	Total cereal area (hectares)
Western Bahr el Ghazal	704 604	123 152	82	100 374	0.91	91 504
Jur River	301 048	48 937	85	41 597	1.00	41 597
Raga	63 270	11 875	75	8 906	0.90	8 015
Wau	340 286	62 340	80	49 872	0.84	41 892
Warrap	1 375 467	241 590	76	183 991	0.99	181 463
Gogrial East	139 113	24 943	84	20 952	0.80	16 761
Gogrial West	346 427	63 893	87	55 587	1.15	63 925
Tonj East	196 009	33 340	73	24 338	0.98	23 851
Tonj North	279 594	50 240	70	35 168	0.90	31 651
Tonj South	126 890	21 307	79	16 833	1.10	18 516
Twic	287 434	47 868	65	31 114	0.86	26 758
Abyei Administrative Area	137 977	20 603	40	8 241	0.85	7 005
Western Equatoria	1 026 065	196 080	78	152 627	1.29	196 380
Ezo ^{1/}	141 097	31 760	83	26 360	1.30	34 269
Ibba ^{1/}	70 600	17 667	83	14 664	1.55	22 729
Maridi ^{1/}	117 243	18 651	80	14 921	1.50	22 382
Mundri East ^{1/}	106 382	15 017	61	9 161	1.10	10 077
Mundri West ^{1/}	52 794	6 257	78	4 880	1.00	4 880
Mvolo	79 939	10 893	70	7 625	1.20	9 150
Nagero	63 408	13 488	65	8 767	0.83	7 277
Nzara ^{1/}	88 860	22 068	93	20 523	1.48	30 374
Tambura ^{1/}	126 600	30 449	62	18 878	0.85	16 046
Yambio ^{1/}	179 142	29 830	90	26 847	1.46	39 197
Total	13 335 009	2 097 697	63	1 337 148	0.94	1 258 886

^{1/} First and second harvested areas combined.

^{2/} Ruweng Administrative Area consists of Abiemnhom and Pariang counties.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Republic of South Sudan, 2025.

Factors affecting yields

Rainfall

Rainfall is the most important driver of crop production along with the security situation in the country. Rainfall analysis is based on data provided by FAO and WFP on rainfall estimates (RFEs) and NDVIs as well as rain gauge data and farmers' observations compiled by the Task Force teams.

Seasonal rains in 2025 had a timely onset across the country, with the first rains occurring in mid-March in *bimodal* areas and in May in *unimodal* areas. Seasonal cumulative precipitation amounts were above average over most cropping areas, with an overall favourable spatial and temporal distribution, which benefited yields.

In some pocket areas, dry spells affected crops and constrained yields. In *bimodal* areas, a two-week dry

spell, between mid-April and early May, was reported in parts of the following counties:

- Juba, Kajo Keji, Lainya and Terekeka counties in Central Equatoria State.
- Mundri East, Mundri West, Mvolo and Nagero counties in Western Equatoria State.
- The dry spell was reported also in pocket areas of the Greater Kapoeta Region.


In *unimodal* areas, dry spells occurred between late June and early July and between late August and early September in parts of the following counties:

- Abiemnhom and Leer counties in Unity State.
- Akoka, Baliyet, Manyo, Melut and Renk counties in Upper Nile State.

- Bor South and Pibor counties in Jonglei State.
- Jur River and Wau counties in Western Bahr el Ghazal State.
- Twic and Tonj North counties in Warrap State.
- Rumbek North and Yirol West in Lakes State.
- Aweil Centre, Aweil South and Aweil West counties in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State.


However, the extent of the affected areas was limited and the short duration of the dry spells often allowed crops to recover. As a result, crop losses were minimal, as confirmed by remote sensing imagery which showed, in September 2025, above-average vegetation conditions in most cropping areas across the country.

Figure 2. Cumulative seasonal rains in 2025 compared to the long-term average, March–November



Source: Author's own elaboration based on data from the FAO. 2025. *GIEWS: Earth Observation*. [Accessed December 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/giews/earthobservation/country/index.jsp?lang=en&code=SSD>.

Map 3. Vegetation Health Index, September 2025



Note: Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map.
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 Source: FAO. 2025. *Earth Observation*. Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS).
<https://www.fao.org/giews/earthobservation/index.jsp?lang=en>

As in recent years, floods were widespread in 2025. The cropping areas affected by floods include:

- Several counties in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States.
- Awerial, Rumbek East, Rumbek North and Yirol West counties in Lakes State.

- Aweil East, Aweil North and Aweil West counties in Northern Bahr El Ghazal State.

However, crop losses were limited as floods occurred late in the season, when crops were mature and hence less vulnerable to flood damage. In addition, in 2025, most farmers in flood-prone areas avoided to plant crops in low-lying areas and increased plantings on high grounds, minimizing flood-related losses.

Figure 3. Rainfall amounts, rainfall estimates and Normalized Difference Vegetation Indices (NDVIs), 2025





Figure 3. Rainfall amounts, rainfall estimates and Normalized Difference Vegetation Indices (NDVIs), 2025 (Cont'.)




Source: WFP. 2025. *World Food Programme/Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (WFP/VAM)*. [Accessed December 2025]. <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/>.

Figure 4. Rainfall anomalies, 2025



Figure 4. Rainfall anomalies, 2025 (Cont'.)



Source: WFP. 2025. *World Food Programme/Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (WFP/VAM)*. [Accessed December 2025. <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/>].

Inputs in the traditional smallholder sector

Manual labour and local planting materials (seeds and cuttings) are the two main inputs in the traditional sector, with farmers relying on shifting cultivation and following to maintain soil fertility. In recent years, the use of ox ploughs has been expanding, mainly in Lakes, Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, the use of animal manure, largely performed by keeping large herds of cattle over crop fields for a certain number of days, is gradually increasing, mainly on sorghum, maize and vegetable crops. Prices of animal manure are negotiated between farmers and cattle keepers, but it is usually too expensive for most smallholder farmers.

The availability of hand tools and labour are the most significant limiting factors for land cultivation by smallholder farmers. For most households, farm size is limited to the area of land that they are able to clear, cultivate and weed with the traditional flat-bladed, long-handled hoe (called *maloda*), the local short-handled, bent hoe (called *toriah*) or the East African hoe (called *jembe*). Other tools used are axes, pangas and rakes. They are usually purchased by farmers from local markets or provided by NGOs, particularly through FAO implementing partners.

In 2025, prices of hand tools continued the increasing trend of the previous years, mainly due to the economic crisis and the devaluation of the South Sudanese pound. For example, in Nzara County of Western Equatoria State, between 2024

and 2025, the prices of hoes and rakes increased from SSP 10 000 to SSP 15 000, while the prices of pangas and slashers increased from SSP 15 000 to SSP 20 000. Similarly, prices of axes increased from SSP 40 000 to 55 000 SSP and prices of *malodas* from SSP 10 000 to SSP 15 000.

In Aweil East, Aweil Centre and Aweil South counties in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, the average prices of hoes increased from SSP 11 600 to SSP 15 600 and prices of *malodas* from SSP 6 000 to SSP 10 000.

Almost all the labour force required for farming activities is sourced from family members, with labour hired only by better-off farmers for digging and weeding operations. The cost of hired labour followed the increasing trend of other inputs in several areas. For example, in Aweil Centre County in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, between 2024 and 2025, the cost of labour for weeding increased from SSP 120 000 to SSP 160 000/feddan. Similarly, in Aweil South County, located in the same State, the cost of labour for the cultivation of 1 feddan increased from SSP 200 000 to SSP 300 000.

The use of draft animals for farming, especially oxen and donkeys, has gradually expanded in recent years. The areas where animal traction is highly used include Lakes, Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria states where, despite the high cost of plough boards, several households buy or hire oxen for cultivation. The increase in the use of animal traction allowed farmers to increase planted area in 2025

compared with the previous year, responding to the prevailing high prices of crops. This encouraging trend was reported particularly in Lakes, Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states. For example, in Lakes State, according to the State Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Environment, two-thirds of farmers use ox ploughs, while the remaining one-third uses traditional hand tools and only few of them use tractors. In these areas, the high demand for animal traction, coupled with high inflation, is reflected by high and increasing hiring rates of oxen cultivation. In Aweil South County, in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, between 2024 and 2025, the hire rates for oxen cultivation increased from SSP 100 000 to SSP 150 000/feddan. Similarly, in Tonj North and Tonj South counties of Warrap State, where about 40 percent of the farmers were reported to own ox ploughs in 2025, between 2024 and 2025, the hire rates for oxen cultivation increased from SSP 100 000 to SSP 150 000/feddan in Tonj North County and from SSP 120 000 to SSP 200 000/feddan in Tonj South County.

Although there are thousands of tractors in the country, only few of them are functional. In most states, 50 percent or less of the available tractors are functional. The number of functioning tractors is often decreasing, mainly due to shortages and high prices of spare parts, lubricants and fuel, which are reflected in increasing hiring costs. In 2025, in Central Equatoria State, the hiring rate for government-owned tractors in Yei County was SSP 300 000/feddan compared with SSP 150 000 in 2024. In Morobo County, in 2025, the hiring rate was SSP 300 000/feddan plus fuel costing SSP 160 000, compared with SSP 250 000 for the tractor and SSP 120 000 for fuel in 2024. In Terekeka County, where there are only two tractors providing hiring services, one owned by the government and the other one owned privately, the hiring rate for the government-owned tractor in 2025 was SSP 250 000/feddan compared with SSP 150 000 in 2024, while the hiring rate for the private tractor was SSP 270 000 plus fuel costing SSP 175 000 in 2025, compared with SSP 150 000 for the tractor and SSP 140 000 for fuel in 2024.

Soil fertility maintenance practices are very limited due to lack of chemical fertilizers. Farmers largely use shifting cultivation and fallowing, while the use

of animal manure is reported mainly in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes states. Manure is sourced from farmers' own livestock in most places, while in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, where opportunities for shifting to new land are limited, contract dunging by pastoralists' herds and flocks on private farming land is increasing from year-to-year. Various modalities of payment are used including cash, grain/sorghum, supplying herders with drinks and meals or goats. While most farmers are aware of the importance of animal dung to increase yields and to control *Striga* weed, the practice of hiring herds of cattle to stay in their farms is only affordable for better-off farmers.

Agrochemicals are not used by smallholder farmers, with some herbicides being used only in few large-scale mechanized farms in Upper Nile State with access to supplies from the Sudan. Small quantities of fertilizers are currently used on vegetables in locations near the border with Uganda by better-off farmers.

The main sources of seeds for most farmers are their own seeds retained from the previous harvest or borrowed from extended family members and neighbours. Some farmers purchase seeds from markets, including improved varieties of maize (*Longi-5*) and groundnuts (*Red Beauty*). FAO, under various emergency projects, has provided seeds and planting materials through distributions by NGOs and seed fairs. In 2025, the price of seeds continued its increasing trend of the previous nine to ten years.

In Melut County in Upper Nile State, the National Rural Development Organization, a local NGO and FAO partner, carried out distribution of seeds and tools and training on good agricultural practices (GAPs). The distribution was conducted in June 2025, targeting 61 groups, each group consisting of 30 farmers. The seeds distributed included sorghum (*Arfa Gadameck*), maize (*Longi-5*) and cowpeas. The tools supplied included hoes, rakes, sickles, *malodas*, solar pumps, wheel barrows and watering cans. The training on GAPs focused on vegetables cultivation, seed production for market (SPM) and crop production for market (CPM).

Pests, diseases and weeds

Every year, numerous types of pests, diseases and weeds infest crops and cause a significant reduction of yields. Despite the damage caused by insect pests and diseases, they remain untreated in the traditional smallholder sector due to low availability and high costs of chemical treatments. Bird scaring and protection of crop fields from wild animals and domestic livestock is usually practiced using family labour.

Pests

The most common pests in the country are green grasshoppers, caterpillars, millipedes, termites, aphids, stalk (stem) borers, sorghum cinch bug, sorghum smut, sorghum midge, snails, rust, blights (on groundnuts), Fall army worm (FAW), local birds, guinea fowls, wild rats, monkeys, rodents, wild pigs, porcupines, domestic livestock and migratory pests, including QQU birds. In 2025, as in previous years, the prevalence of pests across the country was within the normal range, causing only limited damage in most areas, except for Renk, Melut, Baliät, Fashoda, Malakal, Manyo, Longochuk and Nasir counties in Upper Nile State and in parts of the Greater Kapoeta Region where QQU birds significantly damaged sorghum crops. Spraying operations were conducted in some areas of Upper Nile State, but they were not particularly effective as they were performed late, in December 2025, when most damage had already occurred.

Crop damage by cattle, monkeys, squirrels, guinea fowls and porcupines was significant in some localized areas, including Kapoeta East, Kapoeta North and Kapoeta South counties of Eastern Equatoria State, Yirol West and Yirol East counties of Lakes State and Aweil Centre, Aweil South and Aweil North counties in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State. The presence of local birds was reported across the country, but they caused serious damage only in pocket areas of some counties. Stalk borers affected sorghum and maize crops especially in areas where crop rotation is not commonly practiced.

Storage pests, particularly weevils, rats and moulds, caused severe post-harvest losses throughout the country. In the absence of improved crop

storage techniques and facilities, most farmers use traditional practices, which are less effective to protect stored crops.

Diseases

The most common diseases are sorghum head smut, cassava mosaic virus, cassava tuber rot, groundnut rosette virus and leaf spot disease of groundnuts. In 2025, the prevalence of these diseases across the country was within the normal range, causing limited damage in most areas.

Cases of cassava tuber rot (*Phytophthora palmivora*) disease were reported for the first time in 2020 in Western Equatoria State, mainly affecting the Bgobgorogi cassava variety that was introduced from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and planted in counties near the border. It has now expanded to Central Equatoria State, particularly in Lainya and Kajo Keji counties. Farmers in Western Equatoria State reported that local cassava varieties are more resistant to cassava tuber rot disease than newly introduced improved varieties.

Sesame leaf roller moth (*Antigastra catalaunalis*) was first reported in semi-mechanized agricultural areas of Renk and Melut counties in 2020 and, since then, it has been the major cause of yield reduction of sesame crops. However, the damage caused in 2025 was lower than in 2024 and 2023.

Weeds

Infestations by weeds have been expanding at an alarming rate in recent years and adequate control measures need to be undertaken to avoid the situation becoming unmanageable in the future.

In the traditional sector, weeding activities are carried out manually, with sorghum weeded only once during the growing period, while groundnuts and maize are usually weeded twice. The continued cultivation of land for several consecutive years, without any period of fallow, compounded with inadequate weeding practices, has resulted in a build-up of weeds in most cropping areas.

The *Striga hermonthica* parasitic weed remains a major problem for sorghum cultivation in most growing areas, with farmers who have no access to new plots to perform crop rotations and continue

to cultivate the same plots reporting that crops have been severely affected. In the absence of control measures, the damage by *Striga* weed in the main sorghum growing areas, including Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Lakes, Jonglei and Upper Nile states, has been serious in 2025 and increased over time.

A broad-leafed weed, locally known as Babashiro (*Chromolaena odorata*), is another dangerous weed. It spread from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Greenbelt areas of Western and Central Equatoria states, severely infesting cropping areas during shifting cultivation. An invasive weed, known as Parthenium (*Parthenium hysterophorus*), has also been rapidly spreading in the Greater Kapoeta Region (particularly in Kapoeta East, South and North counties of Eastern Equatoria State) over the past seven years. Parthenium is found on roadsides, grazing lands, gardens and croplands, and it has become an issue of great concern for both farmers and pastoralists. No major action has been taken to control these weeds so far.

Agricultural production in 2025

Cereal production

A. Cereal production

As in past years, estimates of the 2025 cereal production in each state were compiled from county level disaggregated data. This information was gained from historical time-series data adjusted with findings of the missions conducted by the Task Force teams at planting and harvesting time, coupled with field observations during the growing period. During field transects, PET-based scores of crop yields were cross-checked by weighing crop-cut samples taken during the case studies. In addition, yield estimates carried out by the CCMCs using crop-cuttings and PET manuals were supplementary sources of information to improve the quality of final yield estimates.

The Mission reviewed the empirical evidence obtained in the field and cross-checked it using secondary data from reports provided by FAO, WFP, NBS and various NGOs, plus remote sensing imagery providing information on vegetation conditions and precipitation amounts, and anomalies as well as

rainfall data collected at county level by FAO-trained operators.

In 2025, 20 field missions were carried out by the Task Force teams. In July, four Task Force teams carried out planting assessment missions in Western Bahr el Ghazal, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes States.

The Western Bahr el Ghazal Team covered Wau, Jur River and Raja counties, and assessed planting activities and the performance of planted crops. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, a Task Force Team travelled to Aweil West, Aweil East, Aweil Centre and Aweil South counties to assess yields of cereal crops, including rice. Simultaneously, other Task Force teams deployed to Warrap State assessing crops in Gogrial West, Twic, Tonj South and Gogrial East counties, and to Lakes State assessing sorghum crops in Rumbek Centre, Yirol West, Wulu and Cueibet counties.

All harvest assessments were conducted in November 2025. All four states of the Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region were visited, namely Northern Bahr el Ghazal State covering all its five counties; Warrap State covering Tonj South, Gogrial West, Gogrial East, Twic and Tonj North counties, Lakes State covering Yirol East, Yirol West, Wulu, Cueibet, Rumbek East and Rumbek Centre counties, and Western Bahr el Ghazal State covering Wau, Jur River and Raja counties. The main season assessment in Jonglei State took place in Bor South County, while the assessment in Unity State was carried out in Rubkona, Guit and Leer counties. Although risks for the teams' safety were still considered too severe to allow access to other areas of Unity State, information was provided by the CCMC leaders that participated in the final analysis workshop organized in Juba in December 2025. Furthermore, telephone interviews with the state directors of agriculture, NGOs, extension workers and members of the CCMCs from inaccessible areas were used as additional sources of information.

In Upper Nile State, a harvest assessment mission was conducted in Renk and Melut counties. The Mission Team assessed yields of local landraces of sorghum (Leuwarding and Agono) and maize in

the smallholder sector and improved Feterita-type sorghums from the Sudan (Arfa Gadameck, Wad Ahmed, Gaddam el Hamam) in both the traditional smallholder sector and the semi-mechanized farming areas.

A second season harvest assessment was conducted in Western Equatoria State covering Yambio, Nzara, Ezo, Ibba, Maridi, Mundri West and Mvolo counties, in Eastern Equatoria State covering Torit, Ikotos, Lopa/Lafon, Kapoeta South, Kapoeta east, Kapoeta South counties and in Central Equatoria State covering Juba, Terekeka, Yei, Morobo and Lainya counties. The crops assessed included maize, sorghum, groundnuts and cassava. The teams that travelled to Central Equatoria State also managed to estimate yields of first season crops, harvested in August 2025.

In Western Equatoria State, along with two Task Force teams, an FAO Crop Monitoring Technical Specialist conducted a detailed assessment of first and second season crops in Nzara and Yambio counties. Data and information were collected through interviews and discussions with the County agriculture directors, officers of the Western Equatoria State Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Environment (SMAFE), farmers and extension workers. For second season crops (mainly rice, maize and groundnuts), direct observations and assessments were possible as they were still in the field at the time of the mission, while the estimation of yields of first season crops, already harvested, was based on secondary data and information collected through interviews.

The FAO Crop Monitoring Technical Specialist carried out a similar mission in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State in Aweil East, Aweil South and Aweil Centre

counties. Data and information were collected through interviews and discussions with officers of the State Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Environment, with the three County agriculture directors, with farmers, extension workers, NGOs and CCMCs. In Aweil Rice Scheme, relevant officers were interviewed. As rice had not yet been harvested at the time of the assessment, standing rice crops in the Scheme were directly observed and assessed.

The national gross cereal production in 2025 from the traditional smallholder sector is estimated at about 1 516 000 tonnes (Table 3), continuing an upward trend which started in 2018 and exceeding the threshold of 1 million tonnes for the seventh consecutive year. Post-harvest losses and seed use for the 2026 planting season are assumed, as in previous CFSAMs, to account for 20 percent of the total production, leaving a net amount of about 1 213 000 tonnes of cereals for local consumption. This output is 8 percent above the 2024 output and almost 27 percent above the average of the previous five years.

The year-on-year increase in production at national level is mainly driven by an expansion of harvested area, reflecting a growing number of farming households, including returnees from the Sudan and urban households cultivating nearby rural land as a secondary source of income in response to high food prices.

The average gross cereal yield is estimated at 1.2 tonnes/hectare, similar to the previous year and almost 9 percent above the average of the previous five years, due to overall favourable growing conditions and despite localized losses due to dry spells and floods.^e

^e Following the CFSAM standard procedure since 2014, conservative yield values have been used for the counties not visited by the Task Force teams at harvest time, where no independent assessments have been conducted and no CCMC reports were available.

Table 3. Estimated (traditional sector) cereal harvested area, yield, production, consumption and balance, 2025 and 2026

State/Administrative Area/County	2025				2026		
	Cereal area (hectares)	Gross yield (tonnes/hectare)	Gross cereal production (tonnes)	Net cereal production (tonnes)	Population (mid-2026)	Cereal requirement (tonnes)	Surplus/deficit (tonnes)
Central Equatoria	120 600	1.5	179 907	143 926	1 694 869	216 537	-72 612
Juba	26 678	1.4	38 150	30 520	574 841	80 478	-49 959
Kajo Keji ^{1/}	20 779	1.6	32 622	26 098	254 733	30 568	-4 470
Lainya ^{1/}	6 557	1.1	7 213	5 770	124 506	14 941	-9 170
Morobo ^{1/}	14 584	1.9	26 981	21 584	127 025	15 243	6 341
Terekeka	16 966	0.7	11 877	9 501	282 922	33 951	-24 450
Yei ^{1/}	35 036	1.8	63 065	50 452	330 842	41 355	9 096
Eastern Equatoria	155 634	1.3	195 373	156 299	1 232 119	152 039	4 260
Budi	22 938	1.2	28 214	22 571	114 721	13 767	8 804
Ikotos	23 828	1.1	26 210	20 968	116 979	14 622	6 346
Kapoeta East	12 768	0.5	6 639	5 312	185 749	23 219	-17 907
Kapoeta North	9 757	0.5	4 879	3 903	172 037	21 505	-17 602
Kapoeta South	5 476	0.7	4 052	3 242	111 933	14 551	-11 309
Lafon	19 446	1.0	19 446	15 557	171 725	20 607	-5 051
Magwi ^{1/}	52 941	1.9	98 470	78 776	289 980	34 797	43 979
Torit	8 481	0.9	7 463	5 970	68 996	8 970	-2 999
Jonglei	70 829	0.8	53 707	42 965	1 888 477	209 593	-166 627
Akobo	13 230	1.2	15 215	12 172	248 050	27 286	-15 115
Ayod	4 113	0.6	2 468	1 974	212 457	23 370	-21 396
Bor South	25 953	0.7	18 167	14 534	371 859	42 763	-28 229
Duk	6 591	0.6	4 086	3 269	217 928	23 972	-20 703
Fangak	1 866	0.7	1 306	1 045	215 540	23 709	-22 664
Khorflus/Pigi/Canal	1 953	0.5	977	781	116 514	12 816	-12 035
Nyirrol	3 272	0.6	1 898	1 518	155 742	17 132	-15 614
Twic East	2 100	0.7	1 365	1 092	135 888	14 948	-13 856
Uror	11 751	0.7	8 225	6 580	214 499	23 595	-17 015
Pibor Administrative Area	20 710	0.8	16 352	13 081	336 402	40 368	-27 287
Lakes	186 953	1.3	235 553	188 442	1 324 932	145 744	42 698
Awerial	22 635	1.2	26 030	20 824	152 894	16 818	4 006
Cueibet	33 463	1.2	40 155	32 124	200 732	22 081	10 044
Rumbek Centre	22 489	1.2	26 312	21 049	236 169	25 979	-4 930
Rumbek East	25 984	1.3	32 999	26 399	191 159	21 028	5 372
Rumbek North	5 186	0.8	3 889	3 111	79 636	8 760	-5 649
Wulu	23 275	1.5	34 215	27 372	97 500	10 725	16 647
Yirol East	22 327	1.1	24 560	19 648	175 798	19 338	310
Yirol West	31 595	1.5	47 393	37 914	191 044	21 015	16 899
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	111 530	1.0	106 975	85 580	1 052 555	115 781	-30 201
Aweil Centre	15 779	0.6	9 941	7 953	86 027	9 463	-1 510
Aweil East	33 907	0.8	25 430	20 344	391 337	43 047	-22 703

Table 3. Estimated (traditional sector) cereal harvested area, yield, production, consumption and balance, 2025 and 2026 (Cont'.)

State/Administrative Area/County	2025				2026		
	Cereal area (hectares)	Gross yield (tonnes/hectare)	Gross cereal production (tonnes)	Net cereal production (tonnes)	Population (mid-2026)	Cereal requirement (tonnes)	Surplus/deficit (tonnes)
Aweil North	23 476	1.0	23 476	18 781	191 570	21 073	-2 291
Aweil South	13 857	0.8	11 363	9 090	156 572	17 223	-8 133
Aweil West	24 510	1.5	36 765	29 412	227 050	24 975	4 437
Unity	19 698	0.9	16 776	13 421	1 026 271	90 987	-77 567
Guit	1 680	1.1	1 848	1 479	76 567	6 507	-5 029
Koch	3 064	1.3	3 984	3 187	108 046	9 184	-5 997
Leer	1 842	0.9	1 566	1 253	85 148	7 238	-5 986
Mayendit	984	0.6	620	496	77 584	6 595	-6 099
Mayom	5 774	0.8	4 330	3 464	172 099	14 628	-11 164
Panyijar	2 979	0.6	1 728	1 382	131 451	11 174	-9 791
Rubkona	3 375	0.8	2 700	2 160	375 377	35 661	-33 501
Ruweng Administrative Area	7 763	1.1	8 541	6 833	206 347	17 538	-10 705
Upper Nile	88 816	0.8	70 907	56 726	1 757 165	152 950	-96 223
Baliet	1 848	0.9	1 590	1 272	25 865	2 198	-926
Akoka	2 674	0.9	2 298	1 839	37 420	3 181	-1 342
Fashoda ^{1/}	3 999	0.7	2 799	2 240	86 057	7 315	-5 075
Longochuk	5 289	0.6	3 332	2 666	81 594	6 936	-4 270
Luakpiny/Nasir	7 615	0.5	3 960	3 168	321 962	27 367	-24 199
Maban	6 338	0.8	5 197	4 158	95 762	8 140	-3 982
Maiwut	7 824	0.6	4 851	3 881	144 768	12 305	-8 425
Malakal	3 192	0.8	2 553	2 043	216 105	20 529	-18 487
Manyo	7 192	1.1	7 695	6 156	90 509	7 693	-1 537
Melut	11 356	0.9	9 880	7 904	142 769	12 135	-4 231
Panyikang	2 046	0.7	1 433	1 146	73 737	6 268	-5 122
Renk	23 542	0.9	21 188	16 950	286 075	25 747	-8 797
Ulang	5 902	0.7	4 131	3 305	154 544	13 136	-9 831
Western Bahr el Ghazal	91 504	1.4	123 946	99 157	731 919	83 350	15 807
Jur River	41 597	1.3	54 075	43 260	310 324	34 137	9 124
Raga	8 015	1.4	11 222	8 977	68 837	6 884	2 094
Wau	41 892	1.4	58 649	46 919	352 758	42 330	4 589
Warrap	181 463	1.1	193 730	154 983	1 424 218	139 174	15 810
Gogrial East	16 761	1.2	19 276	15 420	143 438	13 627	1 794
Gogrial West	63 925	1.2	76 710	61 368	358 411	37 634	23 734
Tonj East	23 851	0.8	19 558	15 646	202 024	20 202	-4 556
Tonj North	31 651	0.9	26 903	21 523	288 141	28 813	-7 291
Tonj South	18 516	1.2	21 849	17 479	130 990	11 788	5 691
Twic	26 758	1.1	29 434	23 547	301 214	27 110	-3 562

Table 3. Estimated (traditional sector) cereal harvested area, yield, production, consumption and balance, 2025 and 2026 (Cont'.)

State/Administrative Area/County	2025				2026		
	Cereal area (hectares)	Gross yield (tonnes/hectare)	Gross cereal production (tonnes)	Net cereal production (tonnes)	Population (mid-2026)	Cereal requirement (tonnes)	Surplus/deficit (tonnes)
Abyei Administrative Area	7 005	0.9	6 304	5 044	145 587	13 102	-8 058
Western Equatoria	196 380	1.6	308 311	246 649	1 056 865	153 245	93 404
Ezo ^{1/}	34 269	1.8	59 970	47 976	145 330	21 073	26 903
Ibba ^{1/}	22 729	1.6	36 821	29 457	72 718	10 544	18 913
Maridi ^{1/}	22 382	1.6	36 482	29 186	120 767	17 511	11 674
Mundri East ^{1/}	10 077	1.0	10 077	8 061	109 573	15 888	-7 827
Mundri West ^{1/}	4 880	1.0	4 880	3 904	54 378	7 885	-3 980
Mvolo	9 150	1.2	10 980	8 784	82 337	11 939	-3 155
Nagero	7 277	1.0	7 277	5 822	65 310	9 470	-3 648
Nzara ^{1/}	30 374	2.0	60 748	48 598	91 526	13 271	35 327
Tambura ^{1/}	16 046	0.9	14 442	11 553	130 399	18 908	-7 354
Yambio ^{1/}	39 197	1.7	66 635	53 308	184 527	26 756	26 551
TOTAL	1 258 886	1.2	1 516 383	1 213 106	13 877 726	1 530 409	-317 303

^{1/} First and second harvested areas combined.

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan (CFSAM), 2025.

Table 4. Harvested area of main cereals in the traditional sector, disaggregated by individual crops in 2025 (hectares)

State/ Administrative Area	Sorghum	Maize	Rice	Finger millet	Pearl millet	Total cereal area (hectares)
Central Equatoria	54 895	60 672	2 457	496	2 080	120 600
Eastern Equatoria	93 629	52 736	427	427	8 415	155 634
Jonglei	58 622	11 738	468	-	-	70 829
Pibor Administrative Area	3 922	16 788	-	-	-	20 710
Lakes	151 441	9 299	-	-	26 213	186 953
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	103 306	3 570	3 241	-	1 413	111 530
Unity	1 530	17 993	-	175	-	19 698
Ruweng Administrative Area	6 129	1 178	-	457	-	7 763
Upper Nile	56 268	31 543	-	1 004	-	88 816
Western Bahr el Ghazal	73 024	12 980	-	2 060	3 441	91 504
Abyei Administrative Area	6 823	182	-	-	-	7 005
Warrap	155 676	13 671	3 358	-	8 758	181 463
Western Equatoria	40 856	97 951	35 667	21 906	-	196 380
South Sudan	806 122	330 301	45 617	26 526	50 321	1 258 886
Percent	64	26	4	2	4	100

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan (CFSAM), 2025.

Table 5. Cereal harvested area and net production (rounded) in the traditional sector, 2021–2025

State/ Administrative Area/County	2021			2022			2023			2024			2025		
	Area (’000 hectares)	Net production (’000 tones)	Net yields (tonnes/ hectare)	Area (’000 hectares)	Net production (’000 tones)	Net yields (tonnes/ hectare)	Area (’000 hectares)	Net production (’000 tones)	Net yields (tonnes/ hectare)	Area (’000 hectares)	Net production (’000 tones)	Net yields (tonnes/ hectare)	Area (’000 hectares)	Net production (’000 tones)	Net yields (tonnes/ hectare)
Greater Upper Nile Region	121	66	0.55	129.0	74	0.57	105.2	66.5	0.63	200.0	134	0.67	207.8	133.0	0.64
Upper Nile	43	22	0.52	48.0	26	0.54	45.0	28.0	0.63	93.0	62	0.67	88.8	56.7	0.64
Unity	15	8.3	0.50	12.4	7	0.53	15.0	8.0	0.55	17.0	10	0.60	19.7	13.4	0.68
Ruweng Administrative Area ^{1/}	5	3.4	0.70	4.5	3.3	0.73	7.2	6.0	0.81	7.4	5.9	0.80	7.8	6.8	0.87
Jonglei	43	22	0.50	47.0	27	0.57	27.0	17.0	0.65	66.0	44	0.67	70.8	42.9	0.61
Pibor Administrative Area ^{2/}	15	10	0.70	17.0	11	0.68	11.0	7.5	0.68	18.0	12	0.68	20.7	13.0	0.63
Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region	523	409	0.78	580.0	468	0.81	740.0	626.0	0.85	535.0	486	0.91	578.4	533.0	0.92
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	171	122	0.72	167.0	117	0.70	172.0	127.0	0.74	102.0	71	0.70	111.5	85.6	0.77
Western Bahr el Ghazal	57	59	1.04	64.0	65	1.00	60.0	66.0	1.10	79.0	90	1.13	91.5	99.0	1.08
Lakes	139	121	0.87	162.0	152	0.94	176.0	179.0	1.02	176.0	176	1.00	186.9	188.4	1.01
Warrap	146	101	0.69	180.0	128	0.71	328.0	253.0	0.77	172.0	147	0.85	181.5	154.9	0.85
Abyei Adminis-trative Area ^{3/}	10	6	0.60	8.0	5.7	0.72	4.0	1.3	0.32	5.8	2.3	0.40	7.0	5.0	0.71
Greater Equatoria Region	351	364	1.04	370.0	394	1.07	301.0	320.0	1.33	440.0	503	1.14	472.6	546.9	1.16
Central Equatoria	79	81	1.03	83.0	91	1.10	74.0	76.0	1.03	110.0	127	1.15	120.6	143.9	1.19
Eastern Equatoria	131	125	0.95	134.0	126	0.94	102.0	93.0	0.91	143.0	144	1.01	155.6	156.3	1.00
Western Equatoria	141	158	1.12	153.0	178	1.16	125.0	151.0	1.21	188.0	233	1.24	196.4	246.6	1.26
South Sudan	995	839	0.84	1 079.0	936	0.87	1 145.0	1 014.0	0.89	1 176.0	1 123.0	0.96	1 258.9	1 213.1	0.96

^{1/} Ruweng Administrative Area is a newly established administration consisting of the previous Abiemthom and Pariang counties in Unity State.

^{2/} Pibor Administrative Area is a newly established Administration consisting of the previous Pibor and Pochalla counties in Jonglei State.

^{3/} Abyei County is organized as separate Administrative Area.

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan (CFSAM), 2025.

B. Mechanized sector

Mechanized rainfed agricultural schemes are mostly located in Upper Nile State, mainly in Renk and Melut counties. The sector includes demarcated, large-scale farms with multiple aggregations of 500 feddans (about 200 hectares) units, known as mushroom and un-demarcated, subsistence type agriculture farms, where farmers cultivate units of up to 50 feddans (20 hectares) alongside large-scale farms, hiring tractors and equipment used by their farmers.

Other mechanized agricultural schemes are in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State. They include the Aweil Rice Scheme on the southern bank of the Lol River in Aweil Centre County, where water from the surrounding flood plains is used for irrigation and the mechanized sorghum farming areas located in Ton Chol (Aweil East County), in Udhum (Aweil West County) and in Ayai-Dang (Aweil East and Aweil South counties). There are also some mechanized farms in other areas, particularly in the Greater Equatoria and in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal regions.

In Upper Nile State, the main crops grown are sorghum and sesame, and mechanization is used mainly for land preparation and sowing, using seed boxes placed over disc harrows, with most of the other operations, including weeding and harvesting, being carried out manually using sickles and hoes. Due to shortages of combine harvesters, only harvesting of sesame is mechanized.

According to key informants, the percentage of farmers cultivating sesame in 2025 declined to just 15 percent as the demand for this cash crop significantly contracted due to the conflict in the Sudan, historically the main export destination. By contrast, the percentage of farmers cultivating sorghum increased to about 70 percent as demand was sustained by the purchasing programmes implemented by WFP and FAO which were procuring grains and seeds, respectively.

In mechanized schemes in Renk and Melut counties, tractors are used for ploughing, while hand tools are used for weeding, harvesting, thinning and planting of vegetable crops. In 2025, prices of hand tools increased from the previous year. Prices of sickles increased from SSP 12 000 in 2024 to SSP 15 000

in 2025, prices of rakes from SSP 20 000 to SSP 30 000, prices of axes from SSP 35 000 to SSP 50 000, prices of pangas from SSP 30 000 to SSP 50 000, prices of hoes from SSP 12 000 to SSP 15 000, and prices of *malodas* increased from SSP 15 000 to SSP 20 000.

Most agricultural inputs including fuel, hand tools, seeds and spare parts for tractors, are usually obtained from the Sudan through informal cross-border trade. Since the outbreak of the conflict in the Sudan in 2023, the supply of these inputs, especially fuel, has significantly declined. Despite the presence of several tractors, including some from the Sudan, their efficient utilization is constrained by shortages and high costs of fuel and spare parts.

In 2025, about one-third of farmers used their own tractors, while the rest relied on tractor hire services. The number of tractors in Renk and Melut counties in 2025 was significantly lower than in 2024, as most Sudanese farmers which fled from the conflict in 2024 with their tractors returned to their country in 2025, following an improvement of the security situation. For example, in Renk County, the number of tractors declined from 1 100 in 2024 to 650 in 2025.

In 2025, the hiring rate for a three-month period (August–October) was SSP 7 000 000, compared with SSP 4 000 000 in 2023. For tractor utilization, a tractor operator and an assistant operator are required and their hiring rates in 2025 were SSP 800 000 and 400 000 compared with SSP 500 000 and 250 000 in 2024, respectively. If a tractor is efficiently used, up to 2 000 feddans can be cultivated in three months.

In 2025, the rainy season in Renk and Melut had a poor performance, with a delayed onset in mid-July, which disrupted planting operations. Intermittent dry spells occurred in August, affecting sorghum, maize and sesame crops, which necessitated some replanting. Seasonal rains subsided in October 2025, in line with the usual seasonal pattern, allowing most replanted crops to develop and mature.

In 2025, in the mechanized farming areas in Renk and Melut counties, sorghum production is estimated at about 230 000 tonnes, substantially

lower than in 2024. The year-on-year decline was mainly caused by reduced plantings due to the low number of available tractors and by low yields in Melut County following unfavourable weather conditions.

In Aweil Rice Scheme, located in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, rice production in 2025 is estimated at 538 tonnes, about 26 percent below the level recorded in 2024. The year-on-year decline mainly reflects a reduction in planted area, which

was partly offset by high yields, supported by favourable growing conditions and the absence of flood-related losses.

The Ayai-Dang, Udhum and Ton Chol semi-mechanized farms are also located in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, mainly growing sorghum and rice. In 2025, the area planted with sorghum in Ayai Dang and Tong Chol schemes was 530 hectares with an average yield of 1.3 tonnes/hectare, and production is estimated at 694 tonnes.

Table 6. Cereal area and production estimates of the mechanized subsector, 2025

State	Farm location	Number of tractor units	Main crops	2025		
				Harvested area (hectares)	Yield (tonnes/hectare)	Production (tonnes)
Upper Nile	Renk	650	Sorghum	168 000	1.20	201 600
	Melut	150	Sorghum	36 288	0.79	28 668
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Ayai-Dang	11	Sorghum	496	1.29	637
	Udhum	2	Rice	11	1.54	17
	Tong-Chol	4	Sorghum	34	1.71	57
	Aweil Rice Scheme	13	Rice	294	1.83	538
Unity	Ruweng	5	Sorghum	147	1.03	151
	Rubkona	0	Maize	19	0.87	17
Total		835		205 289	1.13	231 685

Notes: Tractors were not used efficiently due to shortage of fuel and spare parts.

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan (CFSAM), 2025.

Other crops

Groundnuts and cassava are the two major non-cereal crops grown in the country. Groundnuts are produced across the country, but the most important growing areas are in Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria states. Characterized by a short growing season, groundnuts are an important safety net crop for farming households particularly in northern states, where cassava does not grow, and are also a major cash crop, especially in southern cropping areas of the Greater Equatoria Region where the long-rains season allows for two harvests per year. Cassava is the major safety net and the preferred staple crop in the Greenbelt and in southern areas of the Ironstone Plateau. In Western Bahr el Ghazal State, a two-year cassava is planted either as a sole crop or intercropped with groundnuts, sorghum and sesame. In the Greater Equatoria Region, a two-year cassava is intercropped with a wide range of crops, including

cereals, sesame, groundnuts, pigeon peas and beans during the first year of its development. In the second year, cassava is usually not weeded until harvesting. Cassava is usually the last crop in rotation, as it may be left in the field even for a third year, depending on the needs of farmers in terms of family consumption or sales. While the one-year varieties of cassava are cultivated for consumption or sale as fresh tubers, most farmers in the main cassava growing areas follow the two-year cycle, harvesting tubers after 18–24 months from planting. Cassava tubers sold on the market are processed to obtain cassava chips or cassava flour. Cassava yields vary significantly with the local agroecology and, based on PET photo indicators (plant densities, crown sizes and canopies) and occasional cross-check sample weighing by the Mission, yields in 2025 are estimated to range from 8 to 24 tonnes/hectare of fresh tubers in the major growing areas of the country. The aggregate outputs in 2025 are estimated at about 2.04 million tonnes of cassava and about 274 000 tonnes of groundnuts (Table 7).

Table 7. Cassava and groundnuts indicative area, yields and production estimates, 2025

States/Administrative Area	Cassava (18–24 months)			Groundnuts		
	Area (hectares)	Yield (tonnes/hectare)	Production (fresh, tonnes)	Area (hectares)	Yield (tonnes/hectare)	Production (unshelled, tonnes)
Central Equatoria	19 978	24	479 472	48 128	1.60	77 005
Eastern Equatoria	14 980	23	344 540	2 682	0.90	2 414
Western Equatoria	47 333	21	993 993	41 710	1.20	50 052
Jonglei	605	8	4 840	20 800	1.10	22 880
Pibor Administrative Area	907	10	9 070	-	-	-
Upper Nile	439	10	4 390	2 664	0.84	2 238
Unity	18	8	144	4 540	1.40	6 356
Ruweng Administrative Area	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lakes	5 529	13	71 877	17 928	1.60	28 685
Warrap	1 055	12	12 660	31 329	0.90	28 196
Abyei Administrative Area	-	-	-	7 270	0.80	5 816
Western Bahr el Ghazal	6 379	18	114 822	13 116	2.18	28 593
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	100	13	1 300	12 528	1.80	22 550
South Sudan	97 323	21	2 037 108	202 695	1.36	274 785

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan (CFSAM), 2025.

LIVESTOCK

The livestock sector plays a crucial role in the economy, as the population heavily relies on it both for food consumption and for income generation through the sale of live animals and livestock products. Oxen and donkeys are commonly used for ploughing, while animal droppings provide manure to improve soil fertility, especially in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region. Livestock also has social and cultural functions, including its use in customary transactions such as dowry payments for marriages.

There are two systems of livestock management in the country: sedentary pastoralism, mainly in the Greater Equatoria Region and transhumant pastoralism, predominantly in the Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el Ghazal regions, where the seasonal migration from homesteads to grazing areas occurs in November, with herds returning in May.

In 2025, the national livestock population was estimated at 36.5 million heads, slightly up from previous years and including 12 million cattle, 12.4 million goats and 12.1 million sheep.

The Mission observed that in 2025 the body condition score (BCS) was 3-4 out of 5 for most cattle and small ruminants, higher than in 2024, and the mortality rate was reported at a low 12 percent.

The increase in animal numbers, the improved body conditions and low mortality rate were mainly due to adequate pasture and water availability, reduced flood-induced losses and diseases.

Across the country, endemic diseases include black quarter (BQ), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP), contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP), *peste des petits ruminants* (PPR), hemorrhagic septicemia (HS), foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), diarrhea, Newcastle disease and internal and external parasites.



In 2025, based on the manufacturers' protocols, a total of 3 921 746 animals, owned by 128 742 households (Table 8) have been vaccinated against contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP), anthrax, hemorrhagic septicemia (HS), lumpy skin disease, sheep pox and goat pox, *peste des petits ruminants*, contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP).

Across the country, a total of 276 962 animals belonging to 29 487 households were treated against different diseases, including CBPP, CCPP, East Coast fever (ECF), foot rot, pneumonia, tick-borne diseases, and endo- and ecto-parasites.

Regarding the animal health situation in 2025, no major disease outbreaks were reported. However, 52 disease alerts have been reported between January and October 2025 in Western and Eastern Equatoria states and in hard-to-reach areas in Unity, Jonglei, Upper Nile and Warrap States and in Pibor and Ruweng administrative areas.

Inter- and intra-communal cattle raiding remains common among pastoral communities. In 2025, cattle raids occurred in Unity, Jonglei, Eastern and Central Equatoria states, resulting in temporary displacements and localized crop damage.

Table 8. Livestock vaccinations, 2025

States/ Administrative Area	Number of livestock vaccinated					Total households reached
	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Dogs	Donkeys	
Abyei Administrative Area	99 200	215 240	83 700	350	14	8 424
Central Equatoria	97 478	75 389	84 792	200	0	7 813
Eastern Equatoria	72 149	257 302	181 167	305	0	14 546
Jonglei	245 129	263 601	105 731	3 622	51	41 790
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	103 239	685 394	0	0	0	22 429
Unity	227 296	26 503	22 674	0	0	3 803
Upper Nile	120 845	131 987	71 624	0	0	7 187
Warrap	75 575	33 982	28 112	7	0	1 027
Western Bahr el Ghazal	286 432	120 568	200 000	1 583	505	21 723
Total	1 327 343	1 809 966	777 800	6 067	570	128 742

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan (CFSAM), 2025.

Table 9. Livestock treatments, 2025

States/ Administrative Area	Cattle							Total households reached
	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Poultry	Dogs	Donkeys	Others (pigs)	
Abyei Administrative Area	4 493	8 472	22 387	30	102	13	0	1 933
Central Equatoria	15 303	16 201	11 031	0	56	106	587	2 628
Eastern Equatoria	18 257	20 459	789	63	0	0	0	4 076
Jonglei	27 713	13 428	19 544	40	612	27	0	9 792
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	2 580	1 001	936	0	0	0	0	3 188
Unity	5 607	6 214	2 311	0	0	0	0	1 622
Upper Nile	5 160	9 169	5 572	747	313	508	5	4 356
Warrap	9 918	167	481	0	0	0	0	246
Western Bahr el Ghazal	22 010	23 787	336	145	83	161	38	1 646
Total	111 041	98 898	63 387	1 025	1 166	815	630	29 487

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan (CFSAM), 2025.

CEREAL SUPPLY/DEMAND SITUATION

Cereal balance

Total cereal consumption in 2026 is estimated at 1.53 million tonnes, using a projected 2026 mid-year population of 13.88 million^f and an average per capita consumption of about 110 kg of cereals per year. The estimates of cereal per capita consumption are based on information provided by the 2009 National Baseline Household Survey at state level and adjusted, at county level, to consider the differences between urban and rural areas, and the relative importance in local diets of other crops (notably cassava and groundnuts), livestock and wild foods. An average production of fresh cassava and unshelled groundnuts is expected to bring the estimated average per capita consumption to about 135 kg of cereal equivalent per year, close to the estimates for neighbouring countries.

With an estimated net cereal production from the traditional sector of about 1 213 100 tonnes, an overall rounded deficit of about 317 300 tonnes of cereals is estimated during the 2026 marketing year (January/December), about 9 and 28 percent, respectively, below the deficit estimated for 2025 and the 2021–2025 average. Despite the year-on-year decline, the cereal deficit remains substantial, representing about 20 percent of the estimated cereal requirements in 2026.

The largest shortfalls are forecast in Jonglei (193 914 tonnes), Upper Nile (96 224 tonnes), Unity (88 272 tonnes) and Central Equatoria (72 612 tonnes) states.

The county with the largest food deficit is Juba, where 49 959 tonnes of cereals will be needed in 2026 to cover the food requirements of mostly urban households.



The largest surpluses are forecast in Western Equatoria (93 404 tonnes) and Lakes (42 698 tonnes) states.

Production of cereals in 2025 from the rainfed mechanized sector in Upper Nile, Unity, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria states is estimated at about 232 000 tonnes. It is primarily sorghum grown in Upper Nile's mechanized farms that, in the past, was mostly traded across the border in the Sudan. However, as the ongoing conflict in the Sudan continues to disrupt trade flows, most output is expected to be marketed domestically, while only limited cross-border movements are expected.

This production could be a viable option for local purchases by international organizations providing food assistance in surrounding food deficit areas. In recent years, given the high potential of the area for agriculture and the abundant availability of land, the involvement of local investors has gradually increased. If the availability of inputs, including credit, improves with the support of the government, the mechanized sector can become an important source of cereals for

^f The 2026 population figure was derived by projecting the 2025 population, which includes the resident population plus returnees in 2023 and 2024, using the implicit annual increment of 3 percent and adding the returnees recorded in 2025. Projected returnees for 2026 were not included as most originate from conflict-affected Sudan and displacement dynamics remain highly unpredictable

both local consumption and purchase by international humanitarian partners.


Cereal and livestock markets

In the capital, Juba, prices of maize, sorghum and imported wheat started to surge in February 2024, following the severe depreciation of the national currency. Prices of maize and sorghum continued to follow the sustained upward trend during most of 2025, reaching record levels in September. Prices of maize declined between September and November 2025 by about 20 percent with the commercialization of 2025 crops, while prices of sorghum, after having declined by almost 10 percent in October, reached near-record levels in November.

Prices of imported wheat surged until March 2025, when they remained firm at record levels until November 2025. In the same month, maize prices were more than double their year-earlier levels, sorghum prices were nearly three times higher and imported wheat prices were about 50 percent higher. In November 2025, cereal prices were up to five times their levels in February 2024, when they started to surge (Figure 5).

In addition to the weak national currency, the high food prices are underpinned by insufficient domestic supply and high prices of fuel which inflate transport costs.⁹ In Juba, prices of diesel fuel in November 2025 were more almost 50 percent higher than their year-earlier values (Figure 6).

Figure 5. Juba – Retail prices of selected cereals, SSP/kg



Source: Author's own elaboration based on data from the World Food Programme (WFP) South Sudan. WFP. 2025. *South Sudan - exchange rates*. [Cited December 2025]. <https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/eastern-africa/south-sudan/economic/exchange-rates>.

Figure 6. Juba – Retail prices of diesel fuel (SSP/litre)



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data from the CLiMIS. 2026. *South Sudan: Dashboard*. Crop and Livestock Market Information System (CLiMIS), [Accessed December 2025]. <https://climis-southsudan.org/>.


⁹ Even though the country is an oil producer and exporter, it imports refined petroleum products, as there are no domestic refining facilities.

Prices of sorghum surged in early 2024 also in other markets of the country (Figure 7), with a marked volatility due to the combined effects of exchange rates, fuel prices and local supply/demand interactions. Average sorghum prices in 2025 (January–November) were between 40 and 80 percent higher than the average prices in 2024 (January–November) in Wulu (Lakes State), Pariang (Ruweng Administrative Area) and Malakal (Upper Nile State), while in Nzara Market (Western Equatoria State) average prices over the same period were three times the average prices in 2024.

Livestock is an integral part of local livelihoods and sales of small ruminants are an important source of


income that largely determine pastoralists' capacity to purchase food items. As shown in Figure 8, in Juba, prices of goats started to surge in early 2024, following a sustained upward trend until September, and recording a marked volatility between late 2024 and 2025. In November 2025, prices of goats were 50 percent higher than their year-earlier levels, while prices of maize more than doubled over the same period, and terms of trade for pastoralists deteriorated by 35 percent. In November, in Juba, a goat was equivalent to about 66 kg of sorghum, compared to about 100 kg 12 months earlier. This deterioration indicates a reduced purchasing power of pastoral households and a worsening access to staple foods.

Figure 7. Retail prices of white sorghum in selected markets (SSP/kg)



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data from the CLiMIS. 2025. *South Sudan: Dashboard*. Crop and Livestock Market Information System (CLiMIS), [Accessed December 2025]. <https://climis-southsudan.org/>.

Figure 8. Juba – Retail prices of goats and terms of trade



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data from the CLiMIS. 2025. *South Sudan: Dashboard*. Crop and Livestock Market Information System (CLiMIS), [Accessed December 2025]. <https://climis-southsudan.org/>.



HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION SITUATION

Overview

This section presents the findings of an analysis of household food insecurity in South Sudan during the harvest/post-harvest and lean season as well as historical trends. It identifies and explains the main drivers of food insecurity and examines key components—food availability, access and utilization. In addition, the analysis highlights trends across administrative boundaries, including variations among states.

Methodology

Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System

The primary data on household food security is derived from the 31st round of the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System (FSNMS), a nationwide assessment conducted annually since 2009 by WFP, FAO, UNICEF and government line ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS), Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MHADM) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). International NGOs and national NGO members of the South Sudan Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster also support the exercise.

FSNMS results are representative of the population at national, state and county levels, with a 95 percent confidence level and a 10 percent margin of error. They serve as the primary evidence base for informing key processes such as the IPC analysis, the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), and the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).

Round 31 of the FSNMS conducted in 2025 successfully achieved full coverage across all 80 counties of South Sudan, collecting household-level data from 8 645 households



between July and September despite insecurity and logistical challenges. Active conflict in Nasir and Ulang counties (Upper Nile State) and Mundri West (Western Equatoria) necessitated the replacement of inaccessible or deserted clusters, while some counties in Jonglei and Unity experienced delays due to logistical constraints.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

The IPC is a multi-partner, multidisciplinary food security and nutrition classification system, which provides decision makers with rigorous, evidence-based and consensus-driven analysis of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition to inform emergency responses as well as medium- and long-term policy and programming.

The IPC system was first introduced in South Sudan in 2007 through the Livelihoods Analysis Forum (LAF), facilitated by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and has since continued to conduct regular analytical workshops to determine acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition conditions. The most recent IPC acute food insecurity analysis was conducted from 22 September to 4 October 2025 in Juba and was attended by a multi-agency, multi-sector group of more than 100 in-person and

on-line participants. Findings from this exercise are an essential element of the analysis of household food insecurity presented here.


Household food insecurity

The 2025 harvest/post-harvest season

During the harvest/post-harvest season from December 2025 to March 2026, a total of 14 counties are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) acute food insecurity, while 50 counties are classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). An additional 15 counties fall under IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) and none are classified in IPC Phase 1 (Minimal).

An estimated 28 000 people (0.2 percent of the analysed population) are expected to face IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) levels of food insecurity in Luakpiny/Nasir and Fangak counties. A risk of Famine has been identified for Luakpiny/Nasir County, particularly its southern parts along the Sobat corridor, under a plausible worst-case scenario. Approximately 1.45 million people (10 percent of the analysed population) are likely to experience IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) conditions and around 4.38 million people (31 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) levels of acute food insecurity.

Map 4. IPC acute food insecurity, December 2025–March 2026



Note: Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map.

Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Source: Adapted from: IPC. 2024. Somalia IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis January–June 2024. Rome. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159789/?iso3=SSD>.

Table 10. Estimated population by IPC Phase, December 2025–March 2026

State	Total population analysed	Phase 1 Minimal		Phase 2 Stressed		Phase 3 Crisis		Phase 4 Emergency		Phase 5 Catastrophe		Number of people in Phase 3 or above	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%
Central Equatoria	1 740 513	418 698	24	705 856	41	577 239	33	38 721	2	-	-	615 959	35
Eastern Equatoria	1 218 368	384 187	32	400 691	33	305 729	25	127 761	10	-	-	433 490	36
Jonglei	2 187 359	477 786	22	629 022	29	664 961	30	404 218	18	11 372	1	1 080 551	49
Lakes	1 286 922	310 231	24	490 732	38	415 797	32	70 163	5	-	-	485 960	38
Northern Bahr el Bhazal	1 103 829	225 506	20	407 269	37	348 156	32	122 898	11	-	-	471 053	43
Unity	1 266 751	182 492	14	377 848	30	525 839	42	180 572	14	-	-	706 411	56
Upper Nile	2 224 708	415 993	19	550 005	25	911 458	41	330 768	15	16 484	1	1 258 709	57
Warrap	1 401 874	315 588	23	498 430	36	422 625	30	165 231	12	-	-	587 856	42
Western Bahr el Bhazal	746 534	257 051	34	384 109	51	105 375	14	-	-	-	-	105 375	14
Western Equatoria	1 026 173	501 112	49	413 780	40	104 114	10	7 168	1	-	-	111 281	11
TOTAL	14 203 031	3 488 643	25	4 857 741	34	4 381 292	31	1 447 499	10	27 856	-	5 856 646	41

Notes: A population in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) or even in IPC Phase 1 (Minimal), because of the effects of humanitarian assistance. The population (14 203 031) presented above includes South Sudanese returnees from the Sudan but does not consider 160 330 people residing in Abyei Administrative Area. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages and grand totals are attributed to rounding.


Source: IPC. 2025. *South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September–November 2025 and Projections for December 2025–March 2026 and for April–July 2026*. Rome. 4 November 2025. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159789/?iso3=SSD>.

Long-term trends in household food insecurity

Food security in South Sudan has deteriorated significantly since the outbreak of the conflict in 2013. Widespread displacement and the disruption of services and markets have severely affected the

livelihoods of much of the population. Between April and July 2025, food insecurity reached its highest recorded level, with 7.7 million people facing IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or worse, including an estimated 63 000 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Long-term trends in household food insecurity



Source: IPC. 2025. *South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September–November 2025 and Projections for December 2025–March 2026 and for April–July 2026*. FAO IPC. Rome. 4 November 2025. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159789/?iso3=SSD>.


Conflict, macroeconomic instability and climatic shocks remain the key drivers of food insecurity. Conflict has disrupted livelihoods, restricted population movement and confined communities to hard-to-reach areas without access to humanitarian services/conditions that led to the Famine declaration in Central Unity State in 2017 and Famine Likely conditions in Pibor County in 2020. In 2025, the risk of Famine was projected in Ulang and Nasir counties. While humanitarian assistance helped avert Famine in Ulang County, the risk persists in Nasir County and is expected to continue through the 2026 lean season.

Food security outlook

From April to July 2026, coinciding with the peak of the lean season, a total

of 35 counties are expected to face IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) levels of acute food insecurity. An additional 42 counties are classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), while only two counties fall under IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) acute food insecurity. Even with the planned levels of humanitarian food assistance, an estimated 28 000 people (0.2 percent of the population) are likely to experience IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Approximately 2.3 million people (16 percent of the population) are projected to be in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and about 5.23 million people (37 percent of the population) are expected to face IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) acute food insecurity.

Map 5. IPC acute food insecurity, April–July 2026



Note: Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map.

Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Source: Adapted from: IPC. 2024. Somalia IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis January–June 2024. Rome. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159789/?iso3=SSD>.

Table 11. Estimated population by IPC Phase, April–July 2026

State	Total population analysed	Phase 1 Minimal		Phase 2 Stressed		Phase 3 Crisis		Phase 4 Emergency		Phase 5 Catastrophe		Number of people in Phase 3 or above	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%
Central Equatoria	1 740 513	258 382	15	560 454	32	795 931	46	125 746	7	-	-	921 677	53
Eastern Equatoria	1 218 368	327 084	27	379 411	31	358 281	29	153 593	13	-	-	511 874	42
Jonglei	2 187 359	344 309	16	557 627	25	720 760	33	553 291	25	11 372	1	1 285 423	59
Lakes	1 286 922	210 252	16	418 831	33	478 194	37	179 645	14	-	-	657 840	51
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	1 103 829	115 123	10	326 413	30	441 532	40	220 761	20	-	-	662 293	60
Unity	1 266 751	122 837	10	317 980	25	591 687	47	234 247	18	-	-	825 934	65
Upper Nile	2 224 708	288 201	13	489 177	22	942 929	42	487 917	22	16 484	1	1 447 329	65
Warrap	1 401 874	245 494	18	444 576	32	462 457	33	249 347	18	-	-	711 804	51
Western Bahr el Ghazal	746 534	149 307	20	339 611	45	220 290	30	37 327	5	-	-	257 616	35
Western Equatoria	1 026 173	351 116	34	402 085	39	217 670	21	55 302	5	-	-	272 972	27
TOTAL	14 203 031	2 412 105	17	4 236 163	30	5 229 732	37	2 297 175	16	27 856	0	7 554 763	53

Notes: A population in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) or even in IPC Phase 1 (Minimal), because of the effects of humanitarian assistance. The population (14 203 031) presented above includes South Sudanese returnees from the Sudan but does not consider 160 330 people residing in Abyei Administrative Area. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages and grand totals are attributed to rounding.

Source: IPC. 2025. *South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for September–November 2025 and Projections for December 2025–March 2026 and for April–July 2026*. Rome, 4 November 2025. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159789/?iso3=SSD>.

Drivers of household food insecurity

Food insecurity is mainly driven by conflict and insecurity, low agricultural production, the economic crisis characterized by currency depreciation, high food prices and declining household purchasing power resulting from reduced income opportunities and dwindling household coping capacity associated with a protracted period of asset depletion. Limited income-earning opportunities are significantly contributing to the decline in food access for large proportion of households. The situation is exacerbated by flooding that has affected 1.35 million people leading to high levels multisectoral humanitarian needs, amidst dwindling funding and access constraints stemming from increased insecurity in 2025.

Conflict-related shocks

South Sudan faced a sharp escalation of conflict in 2025 due to renewed clashes between SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO, subnational and localized violence, resulting in widespread displacement and deepening

humanitarian needs. About 479 000 people were displaced in 2025, with conflict hotspots located in Upper Nile (Nasir, Ulang and Baliet counties) and Jonglei State (Fangak, Pigi/Canal, Nyirol), Unity, the Greater Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal. In addition to the internal and external displacement of the population, the conflicts constraint livelihood including agricultural production thus worsening the food security situation and disrupting delivery of humanitarian assistance and essential services including health, WASH and education.

The conflict in the Sudan continues to drive large-scale displacement into South Sudan. As of 30 January 2026, a total of 1 322 903 people have arrived in South Sudan since the outbreak of fighting in April 2023.^{iv} Of these, 890 313 individuals (67.3 percent) are South Sudanese nationals who had previously fled to the Sudan due to earlier conflict in South Sudan and are now being forced to return. Most returnees are concentrated in the states bordering the Sudan, Upper Nile, Unity, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, as well as Abyei Administrative Area, where humanitarian pressure continues to rise.

Arrivals surged in early 2025 following intensified clashes between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Rapid Support Forces but declined slightly later in the year. Given the ongoing hostilities between rival armed forces in the Sudan, further movements into South Sudan remain likely. However, the majority of new arrivals are expected to remain near the border areas due to worsening insecurity across many parts of South Sudan, which continues to limit safe onward movement.

Climate-related shocks

Flooding in 2025 reached severe levels, with the extent of inundation across the Sudd marshes and surrounding areas peaking higher than in 2024, though still below the record extent of 2022. More than 1.35 million people were affected, and nearly 376 000 people were displaced across 39 counties.^v The states of Jonglei, Lakes and Unity accounted for 88 percent of all affected individuals, reflecting their extreme vulnerability to flooding. The floods caused widespread destruction of homes, essential infrastructure and localized crop losses. In contrast to previous years, flooding was significantly less extensive in western Sudd, Tonj areas of Warrap, and across the Greater Bahr el Ghazal, marking a notable shift in flood distribution patterns. This contributed positively to agricultural production in these areas.

Macroeconomic shocks

South Sudan's economy, over 90 percent dependent on oil revenues, suffered a severe shock after conflict in the Sudan forced the shutdown of the Dar Blend oil export pipeline in early 2024, with impacts continuing throughout 2025.^{vi} Oil production fell from 160 000 barrels/day to about 60 000 barrels/day, cutting government revenue and foreign exchange inflows. The economy contracted by an estimated 26 percent in 2024 as oil output fell sharply during the pipeline shutdown. Oil exports resumed in April 2025 following repairs, leading to a 24 percent recovery of the GDP in 2025, though the ongoing insecurity in the Sudan continues to threaten the stability of oil flows.

South Sudan's liquidity crisis in 2025 crippled government operations and service delivery as ministries struggled to pay salaries and access funds, while commercial banks ran out of cash and

restricted withdrawals to under USD 10/day.^{vii} The shortage of cash accelerated the depreciation of the South Sudanese pound and drove inflation higher, making imported goods increasingly unaffordable. As liquidity dried up, households saw their purchasing power collapse and food prices surged, worsening an already severe food security crisis that had been exacerbated by inflation, low local crop production and climate shocks. As a result, high levels of food insecurity persist and large proportion of the affected households continue to rely on humanitarian assistance, deepening the country's economic and social distress.

Dynamics of household food insecurity

Household food insecurity outcomes

Food consumption

Household food consumption was captured and analysed using the food consumption score (FCS). The FCS is an indicator used by WFP and endorsed by the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, which measures dietary diversity, consumption frequency and relative nutritional importance of household food consumption.

Household food consumption across South Sudan remains critically low. Nationally, 71 percent of households have inadequate food consumption with about 38 percent having poor and 33 percent borderline food consumption, while only 29 percent have acceptable consumption. This indicates that the majority of households do not meet basic dietary requirements and remain highly vulnerable to food insecurity (Figure 10). The prevalence of a poor FCS was particularly high in Warrap (55 percent), Upper Nile (47 percent), Lakes (44 percent), Western Equatoria (41 percent), Jonglei (39 percent) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (38 percent) states. Overall, no state has at least half its households with acceptable food consumption, underscoring a nationwide crisis.

Households relied mainly on the consumption of staple foods such as maize, sorghum, cassava, rice and millet. On average, households consumed staple foods 4.74 days during the week prior to the assessment,

and 77 percent reported consuming staples in the 24 hours preceding the survey (Figure 11).


Staple consumption was often complemented by vegetables, primarily green leafy vegetables, tomatoes, onions, peppers and okra. About 63 percent of households consumed vegetables in the past 24 hours, while the average frequency of vegetable consumption during the week prior to the assessment was 3.1 days.

Consumption of dairy products was more frequent among households in Unity, followed

by Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Warrap states. Dietary diversity was relatively higher in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Central Equatoria. In contrast, low dietary diversity was observed in structurally food-insecure regions, particularly the Greater Upper Nile, Lakes and Warrap states.


The lowest dietary diversity was recorded in Jonglei State, where approximately 45 percent of households consumed only two food groups in the 24 hours preceding the assessment.

Figure 10. Household food consumption score



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Figure 11. Percentage of households consuming each food group in the past 24 hours preceding the interview



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Coping strategies

Households employ a range of coping strategies to manage extreme food shortages. These strategies are assessed using two key indicators: the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI)^{viii} and the Livelihood Coping Strategy for Food Security (LCS-FS).^{ix} The rCSI captures the extent to which households resort to consumption-based coping strategies, actions taken to reduce food expenditure when faced with shortages. It reflects both the frequency and severity of food-related coping behavior used during the seven days preceding the survey. A higher rCSI indicates that a household has more frequently used more severe consumption-based strategies, signaling greater hardship. The LCS-FS measures the use of livelihood-based coping strategies, actions households adopt to increase income or reduce essential expenditures when confronted with food shortages. Unlike short-term consumption indicators such as the rCSI, LCS-FS focuses on livelihood-based responses that may have lasting impacts on household wellbeing, productivity and resilience.


Overall, 94 percent of households adopted at least one consumption-based coping strategy to meet their food needs. Higher rCSI score indicates more frequent use of severe consumption-based coping strategies by households (Figure 12). High reliance on consumption-based coping strategies was observed in Warrap (20), Jonglei (20), Lakes (18) and Western Bahr el Ghazal. The lowest rCSI was recorded in Western Equatoria (8), indicating comparatively less severe consumption-based coping strategies.

The most frequently reported consumption-based coping behaviours included: relying on less preferred, less expensive foods (91 percent), reducing meal portion sizes (89 percent), reducing the number of meals consumed per day (86 percent) and restricting consumption by adults for children to eat (76 percent).

In addition to consumption-related adjustments, households also relied on livelihood-based coping strategies to confront severe food shortages. Nationally, about 46 percent adopted emergency coping strategies, 17 percent adopted crisis strategies and 12 percent adopted stressed strategies. Emergency coping strategies are typically used only in extreme situations and often involve irreversible actions. As a result, they can significantly undermine a household's resilience and its future capacity to cope with ongoing or future shocks affecting food security.

At the national level, households most commonly rely on borrowing/credit and sending members to eat elsewhere, while a significant minority harvest immature crops or consume seeds, undermining future food production (Figure 13). Upper Nile and Jonglei exhibit the most severe profiles, with high migration, begging and asset liquidation (including selling productive assets and the last animal). Central Equatoria shows acute agricultural distress, with over half of households harvesting immature crops (52 percent) and high reliance on credit (54 percent). Lakes and Unity display broad stress across multiple strategies, whereas Western Equatoria's profile is driven by harvesting immature crops. Western

Figure 12. Average household consumption-based coping strategy index




Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Bahr el Ghazal is lower across most strategies but shows elevated household asset sales. These patterns highlight an urgent need for targeted assistance to reduce negative coping, protect productive assets and support agricultural recovery.

Overall, the analysis shows that most households in the country continue to rely heavily on both consumption-based and livelihood-based coping

strategies to meet their food needs, highlighting widespread food insecurity. The near universal use of consumption-based strategies, coupled with the high prevalence of emergency and crisis livelihood strategies, underscores the severity of current conditions. These coping behaviors, especially the irreversible emergency strategies, pose significant risks to households' future resilience, as they erode assets and reduce the ability to withstand future shocks.

Figure 13. Household adoption of consumption-based coping strategies




Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Figure 14. Household livelihoods-based coping strategy index



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Figure 15. Household adoption of livelihood-based coping strategies



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Household food insecurity dimensions


Food availability

This section examines key components of household level food availability, focusing on household production and market supplies. Households that rely on their own crop production have reduced dependence on market purchases for food. This strengthens their immediate and consistent access to food and offers partial protection against market-related shocks, including elevated prices, market volatility and periodic supply chain disruptions. Reliance on own crop production as the main source of staple foods was most prominent in Western Equatoria (71 percent), Central Equatoria (36 percent) and Eastern Equatoria (34 percent), Figure 16. Percentages reflect the lean season

situation. This means that the shares of own stocks are even higher during the harvest season compared to the lean season when the data was collected. Greater Equatoria has *bimodal* rainfall patterns comprising of two growing seasons with crop production being the main livelihood activity.

In 2025, market purchases were the primary source of cereals for most households across the country. Overall, 51 percent of households reported markets as their main source of cereals, compared with 26 percent who relied on their own crop production and 12 percent who cited humanitarian food assistance. Market dependence was particularly high in Western Bahr el Ghazal (76 percent), Warrap (69 percent) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (69 percent).

Figure 16. Household source of staple foods



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Food access

This section examines the key elements of household-level food access, focusing on both physical and financial access to food. Across the country, the most important income sources reported by households over the past three months (Figure 18) included agriculture (46 percent), sales of livestock, livestock products and poultry (10 percent), and sales of natural resources such as honey, firewood, poles, gum Arabic, grass, charcoal and stones (11 percent). Agriculture was particularly significant in Lakes, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria states.


In Lakes State, ongoing reforms combined with increased use of ox-plough cultivation have significantly improved crop production, strengthening household dependence on agricultural sales as their primary source of income.

As a result, 85 percent of households in Lakes reported agriculture as their main income source, the highest share in the country, followed by households in Greater Equatoria.

Overall, 10 percent of households relied on the sale of livestock and livestock products as their main source of income. These income activities were more prevalent in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, particularly in Eastern Equatoria (20 percent), Warrap (19 percent), Jonglei (18 percent), Unity (12 percent) and Upper Nile (11 percent).


Sales of forest and natural resource products were also an important income source, especially in Western Bahr el Ghazal (28 percent), Unity (19 percent), Jonglei (18 percent), Upper Nile (18 percent) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal

Figure 17. Household travel time to nearest operational marketplace



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Figure 18. Household most important income source in past three months



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

(17 percent). Gathering or selling wild foods was most common in Jonglei (13 percent), followed by Unity (10 percent), Northern Bahr el Ghazal (8 percent) and Warrap (8 percent). Increased reliance on these less reliable income sources reflects deep-seated vulnerability in these states.


Physical and financial access to the market determines households' ability to access food from the markets. In addition, poor infrastructure limits trade flows from agriculturally productive areas to the structurally food insecure states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal. The distance to the nearest market has implications for the time market dependent households require to obtain food. Nationally, 9 percent of households needed half a day or more to reach the nearest operational market, while 38 percent required between one hour and less than half a day (Figure 18). The longest travel times to markets were reported in Upper Nile, Eastern Equatoria, Unity, Lakes and Jonglei states.

In addition, about 34 percent of households, mostly in Greater Upper Nile, accessed staple cereals through humanitarian food assistance (see the Humanitarian Assistance section).

The survey findings indicate a widespread decline in household income across nearly all states in South Sudan. The large proportion of households reporting large decrease highlights a broad economic stress driven by persistent macroeconomic instability and livelihood depletion. Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria states stand out with the highest proportions of households reporting income losses (about 70 percent and 56 percent, respectively) pointing to acute vulnerability in these states. Similarly, Lakes shows substantial economic deterioration, where nearly half of respondents reported a decrease.

While Central Equatoria demonstrates a comparatively higher share of households reporting no change (52 percent), likely linked to the relative economic concentration in the capital, a notable proportion still experienced declining income, amid ongoing inflation. Positive or stable income shifts remain rare nationwide, with increases seldom exceeding a combined 20 percent in any state. In Western Bahr el Ghazal State, 32 percent of households reported an increase in income though the majority cited small increases. Overall, the data aligns with broader assessments of prolonged economic decline, high poverty levels and increasing household vulnerability, compounded by conflict, disrupted markets and weak macroeconomic performance across South Sudan.

Figure 19. Household self-reported income changes in past three months



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Household food expenditure share


Higher food expenditure shares (FES) typically signal greater economic vulnerability: households spend a larger share of their total expenditure on food, leaving less for health, education, shelter and shocks. On the other hand, lower FES categories (low/medium) suggest better economic capacity and lower sensitivity to food price/income shocks. Households were categorized to have very high (over 75 percent of expenditure allocated to food), high (between 65 percent and 75 percent of expenditure allocated to food), medium (between 50 percent and 65 percent of expenditure allocated to food) and low (less than 50 percent of expenditure allocated to food).

Food expenditure shares show significant variation in household economic vulnerability across South Sudan. Nationally, 45 percent of households fall within the high or very high FES categories, indicating widespread pressure on household budgets and vulnerability to price shocks, income disruptions and seasonal lean period stress. Jonglei, Upper Nile, Eastern Equatoria and Unity states exhibit the highest vulnerability, with large proportions of households allocating more than half of their expenditures to food, reflecting constrained income opportunities and heightened exposure to market volatility. In contrast, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and

Warrap states display comparatively lower FES levels, suggesting relatively better financial access to food. Overall, the distribution of FES underscores persistent disparities in purchasing power and highlights the need for targeted livelihood support, market-strengthening measures and safety net interventions in the most affected states.

Jonglei State shows the most severe vulnerability, with half of households falling into the very high FES category. Eastern Equatoria, Unity and Upper Nile also exhibit substantial pressure, exceeding one-third of households (36 and 35 percent respectively). Western Equatoria (15 percent) and Central Equatoria (21 percent) states display relatively lower levels of vulnerability, with fewer households experiencing high food expenditure pressure compared to other states. Warrap and Western Equatoria have a large proportion of households with low food expenditure pressure, though both states also maintain nontrivial shares of households in the very high category (28 percent and 15 percent, respectively). Jonglei remains the most affected state across combined risk levels, with nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of households experiencing high or very high FES. In contrast, Western Equatoria shows the lowest combined pressure, indicating comparatively stronger household resilience.

Figure 20. Household food expenditure share classification



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Household access to humanitarian assistance

The analysis of humanitarian assistance coverage across South Sudan, according to the FSNMS R31, reveals significant disparities in both overall assistance and general food distribution (GFD) among the states. Nationally, 34 percent of the population received some form of humanitarian support, while 25 percent benefited from food assistance. This gap indicates that, while food assistance represents a substantial share of the response, other critical services, including health, protection, WASH and livelihood support, remain central to meeting community needs.

The highest levels of assistance were observed in Greater Upper Nile (Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile), which continue to experience the most severe humanitarian conditions. Jonglei reported the greatest coverage, with 61 percent of its population receiving humanitarian assistance and 56 percent receiving GFD. Unity followed closely at 57 percent and 53 percent, respectively, reflecting the state's ongoing struggles with conflict, displacement and recurrent flooding. In Upper Nile, 51 percent received humanitarian assistance and 41 percent received food support, underscoring persistent vulnerabilities that place all three states firmly among the country's humanitarian hotspots.


A second tier of states, including Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Warrap, showed moderate assistance levels. Eastern Equatoria's 41 percent humanitarian assistance contrasted with its lower 23 percent GFD coverage, suggesting that non-food interventions constitute a substantial portion of the response in that state. Lakes exhibited a more balanced pattern, with 30 percent receiving humanitarian

assistance and 24 percent benefiting from food distributions. Warrap's coverage remained lower at 14 percent for humanitarian assistance and 10 percent for GFD, though still notable relative to the lowest-performing states.

Coverage was lowest in Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria. Central Equatoria's wide gap where 18 percent humanitarian assistance versus just 2 percent GFD may reflect differences in needs or programme prioritization. Northern Bahr el Ghazal reported similarly low GFD at 2 percent despite chronic food insecurity concerns. Western Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria showed the lowest levels nationally, with humanitarian assistance at 10 percent and 5 percent, respectively and no recorded GFD, signaling limited humanitarian presence or fewer food security interventions.

Across all states, several key trends emerge. First, in high-need areas such as Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, food assistance closely aligns with overall humanitarian coverage, indicating a heavy reliance on GFD as a primary form of support. Second, in states where humanitarian assistance is moderate, but GFD remains low, such as Eastern and Central Equatoria, the response likely emphasizes broader sectoral interventions beyond food. Third, disparities between the highest and lowest assisted states are stark, with coverage ranging from 5 to 61 percent. Finally, the extremely low GFD levels in several states likely reflect a combination of prioritization decisions, operational access challenges, differences in local food security conditions and shifts in donor or agency focus.

Figure 21. Household access to humanitarian assistance, in-kind, cash, voucher or hybrid



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Table 12. Household access to humanitarian assistance (percent)

State	Any form of humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian food assistance (GFD, FFA)	Food for school children	Nutrition	Agricultural inputs (seeds)	Agricultural tools	Fishing gears	Veterinary services
Central Equatoria	18	3	0	0	14	9	0	0
Eastern Equatoria	41	27	2	8	12	6	0	1
Jonglei	61	58	1	11	4	4	2	0
Lakes	30	26	1	4	1	2	0	0
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	13	4	1	2	3	5	0	0
Unity	57	53	4	3	1	1	0	0
Upper Nile	51	45	3	7	6	5	2	0
Warrap	14	13	1	1	1	0	0	0
Western Bahr el Ghazal	10	0	1	1	9	2	0	0
Western Equatoria	5	1	0	0	3	1	0	0
Total	34	27	1	4	5	4	1	0

Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Food utilization

This section examines key factors influencing household-level food utilization, including food preparation practices, food safety and access to safe water. Access to clean and potable water, critical for maintaining food hygiene, forms an essential component of food utilization.

Nationally, nearly half of households (49 percent) rely primarily on boreholes as their main water source, while one-quarter (24 percent) relies on surface water. With additional households using

public stand taps and protected wells, approximately 60 percent have access to improved water sources. In contrast, about 28 percent continue to rely on unimproved water sources.


Dependence on surface water is particularly high in Upper Nile and Jonglei, where about 55 percent and 42 percent, respectively, of households use rivers, streams, or open water points. Conversely, strong borehole coverage is observed in Lakes (73 percent), Warrap (72 percent) and Western Bahr el Ghazal (67 percent). In Western Equatoria, unprotected

water sources remain common, with 11 percent of households relying on unprotected springs and another 7 percent collecting water from unprotected wells. Overall, only 9 percent of households treat their water before consumption.

Sanitation also plays a critical role in food utilization. Poor sanitation significantly threatens health, nutrition


and food security, particularly in areas affected by widespread flooding. FSNMS Round 31 found that three in four households (75 percent) lack access to any toilet facility and practice open defecation. Only 21 percent use pit latrines, either with or without slabs, whether private or shared. The use of pit latrines is most common in Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal.

Figure 22. Household main drinking water sources



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Figure 23. Availability of toilet facilities



Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

Acute malnutrition

Between July 2025 and June 2026, an estimated 2.11 million children aged 6–59 months are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition and require urgent nutrition services and treatment. This projection is similar to the level of acute malnutrition observed during the July 2024 to June 2025 period. In addition, approximately 1.15 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to be acutely malnourished and in need of treatment, slightly higher than the 1.11 million recorded in the previous year.

Around 70 percent of acute malnutrition cases are concentrated in five states: Jonglei, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Unity and Warrap. During the first projection period, the harvest and post-harvest season from October 2025 to March 2026, the acute malnutrition situation is expected to deteriorate in 46 counties, with 20 counties likely to shift into a higher IPC AMN phase. Of particular concern are five counties (Duk in Jonglei State; Rubkona in Unity State; and Baliet/Akoka, Ulang and Nasir in Upper Nile State) and Abyei Administrative Area, which are projected to fall into IPC AMN Phase 5 (Extremely Critical) during the lean season from April to June 2026. This deterioration is driven by reduced access to nutrition and health services due to conflict, a worsening cholera outbreak and widening food consumption gaps.

The drivers of acute malnutrition are multiple and interconnected. Poor food consumption, high disease burden, suboptimal caring and feeding

practices, and limited access to safe drinking water and sanitation all contribute significantly to the situation. These challenges are further exacerbated by widespread vulnerability to food insecurity.

Estimated food assistance requirements and planned actions

WFP, the largest provider of food assistance in South Sudan, plans to support approximately 3.35 million people in 2026 through a mix of food and cash assistance, including 63 200 metric tonnes of assorted food commodities for vulnerable populations across South Sudan (Table 13). However, projected food insecurity during the April to July 2026 lean season is significantly higher than WFP's planned caseload.

Prioritization of WFP general food distributions is based on the IPC analysis released in November 2025. WFP's integrated emergency response in early 2026 will concentrate on counties with pockets of population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe); counties with food-gap driven extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition and counties included in WFP's 2025 famine prevention response that face a combined extreme acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition situation together with a highly concerning past food insecurity trajectory. Given the concentration of high levels of acute food insecurity in the region, WFP's 2026 lean season response will focus on counties classified as IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) during the 2026 lean season in Greater Upper Nile.

Table 13. Operational plan, 2026

State	Individuals	Staple CER, PUL, OIL, SAL (metric tonnes)	Specialized CSB++, LNS-MQ, LNS-LQ (metric tonnes)	Cash transfers (USD)
Central Equatoria	27 284	-	9	1 712 319
Eastern Equatoria	66 393	-	-	1 878 029
Jonglei	836 912	26 956	3 246	2 853 094
Lakes	244 167	26	1 647	1 713 224
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	472 392	-	3 290	6 232 231
Unity	612 129	5 589	1 283	29 329 538
Upper Nile	778 415	16 427	2 448	22 375 342
Warrap	282 868	413	1 856	5 505 808
Western Bahr el Ghazal	-	-	-	-
Western Equatoria	32 596	-	10	1 801 653
Total	3 353 156	49 411	13 789	73 401 236

Source: Authors' own elaboration, World Food Programme (WFP), 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Crops

To increase domestic food production in 2026 and reduce food import and food assistance requirements in 2027, the following measures are recommended:

- Support farmers during the 2026 cropping season by providing seeds and tools, extension services and training on how to restore production to pre-conflict levels, while protecting the livelihoods of small-scale subsistence producers in the low potential agricultural areas.
- Strengthen support to farmers through training in improved agricultural practices for land preparation, effective weeding, integrated pest management and soil fertility management to boost productivity and production.
- Develop and implement a strategy to mitigate the impact of *Striga* weed, which severely affects sorghum yields.
- Strengthen the Crop Protection Department of the MoAFS to enhance its capacity to prepare and implement an action plan to reduce the impact of pests, diseases and weeds on crop productivity.
- Promote crop diversification by supplying planting materials of various non-cereal crops, including roots and tubers, pulses and fruit trees, through the establishment of plant multiplication centres and community-managed nurseries.
- Provide post-harvest training and equipment to help farmers reduce crop losses associated with inadequate storage practices.
- Strengthen the surveillance system for migratory pests, including QQU birds and desert locusts, to enable timely implementation of control measures. Ensure continuous monitoring and



control of desert locust swarm movements in collaboration with DLCO-EA.

- Strengthen the CCMCs network through continuous training in crop assessment methodology and techniques, in collaboration with the SMOAs.
- Support the establishment of effective two-way communication channels between the counties and national institutions (e.g., MoAFS and NBS) to improve coordination, information flow and exchange, and ultimately the quality of CCMC reports.

Livestock

- Develop and implement a strategy to conduct a comprehensive livestock census, using an appropriate and robust methodology.
- Expand animal health interventions, with particular emphasis on the following actions:
 - ◆ Train and deploy new community animal health workers to expand delivery of veterinary services at the community level.

- ◆ Assess the coverage and effectiveness of the current vaccination programme and adopt a risk-based approach to better target diseases and risk zones.
- ◆ Promote sustainable, market-based delivery of veterinary services, ensuring improved access to quality veterinary drugs, supplies and cold-chain infrastructure.
- Support the transition of livestock rearing activities towards a modern, market-oriented and commercially viable sector. In particular:
 - ◆ Promote peri-urban smallholder dairy production and support backyard poultry production systems.
 - ◆ Conduct a comprehensive study of the national livestock economy to generate evidence for informed policy decisions and strategic planning.
- Strengthen the livestock information system to systematically monitor key indicators, including animal production, productivity, marketing, movement/migration patterns, pasture and water availability, animal health, and access to veterinary services.

Markets

- Promote local procurement of seeds and grains in surplus areas, taking into consideration local market dynamics and trade flows.
- Promote the organization of seed fairs to enable farming households access locally available seeds and tools that are well adapted to local conditions, while supporting community-based agro-dealers and revitalizing local economies.
- Maintain and strengthen existing price and market monitoring systems by expanding the number of monitored commodities and markets as well as reinforcing cross-border market monitoring.
- Expand the use of targeted cash-based transfers (CBT) to sustain local demand,

stimulate market-oriented crop production and improve market stability.

- Promote livestock trade and enhance access to livestock markets, including in cross-border areas.
- Support the rehabilitation and maintenance of key transport infrastructure, including feeder roads, river transport routes and market access corridors, in order to improve market functioning, facilitate trade flows between surplus and deficit areas and reduce transaction costs.

Food security

- Strengthen assistance for returnees in Upper Nile, Unity, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Abyei, where the number of arrivals is high, including by establishing temporary transit centres with food, WASH and protection services.
- Continue to support climate resilience efforts through the enhancement of climate monitoring, early warning systems and anticipatory action, construction and rehabilitation of community assets that provide protection against climate-related shocks such as floods and droughts and construction and restoration of household assets to mitigate the impacts of previous and future climate shocks.
- Continue to support road construction and rehabilitation, dike rehabilitation, upgrading of river ports, river clearance and dredging, airstrips rehabilitation and bridge construction to facilitate humanitarian operations and market access.
- Continue to support efforts to reduce all forms of malnutrition including the treatments of malnourished pregnant women, girls, new mothers, children under five years of age, elderly and people living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or tuberculosis (PLHIV/TB).
- Continue to support school feeding programmes as a vital safety net for

vulnerable children, helping to improve access to education, close nutritional gaps and reduce risks such as early pregnancy and child marriages.

- Adopt a home-grown approach to school feeding wherever feasible, utilizing locally-produced food, especially from smallholder farmers, while supporting vulnerable households in urban areas.
- Continue conducting regular food security and nutrition monitoring and assessments to inform decision-making and enable timely interventions.
- Ensure an effective humanitarian response by advocating for unhindered access and predictable clearances, to enable timely delivery of assistance. Strengthen coordination across key clusters, particularly FSL, Nutrition, WASH and Protection to enhance coherence, efficiency and impact.



ANNEXES



Table A1. Indicative seasonal cropping calendar

	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January	February
Unimodal rainfall zone found in Greater Bahr el Ghazal; Greater Upper Nile	Rainfall	Dry season	Wet season						Dry season			
	Main crop		Land preparation and planting	Growing season			Harvest					
	Long-cycle crops			Growing season				Harvest				
Bimodal rainfall zone found in Greater Equatoria	Rainfall	Dry season	Wet season							Dry season		
	First crop	Land preparation and planting		Growing season		Harvest						
	Second and third crops					Land preparation and planting		Growing season		Harvest		

Note: Recent changes are blurring the divisions.

Source: Authors' own elaboration, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2025.

Recommendations for strengthening Roadmap and CCMCs, 2025:

- During the travel restriction imposed by the government in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, CCMCs have proved to be very important assets in providing grassroots-based information regarding the progress of the rainy season, the performance of the crops and the negative impacts of the floods and pests through telephone calls, e-mails, Skype and other social media like WhatsApp. Hence, it is recommended to strengthen the CCMC networks across the country and the on-line communication capacity of the CCMC members.
- The estimation of planted areas in the mechanized sector needs to be supported with satellite-based estimation due to the difficulty of measuring areas by the Task Force teams and CCMCs on the ground.
- Maintain planting assessments to spot checks on planted area only in representative sample counties.
- As soon as security allows, conduct crop assessment and yield estimation training for carefully selected SMOAs and NGOs staff in all the new states.
- Provide CFSAM guides and training, for county level CCMCs established by FAO and MAFS to the new states.
- Introduce mobile apps for use by the National Task Force teams and CCMCs that have already demonstrated willingness and capacity to assess progress of the season and timely reporting to FAO/MAFS Crop Assessment Team. The introduction could be planned during a short series of training courses early in the first season in Western and Central Equatoria states.
- Increase the range of timing of full harvest assessments to allow each main crop, in each State to be assessed.
- Continue to transfer the responsibility of conducting the field work of all assessments in a staggered manner (to accommodate harvest dates) to SMOAs, funded by FAO-EU project, **ONLY** where suitable levels of competence and integrity have been demonstrated. This means adjusting the role of the National Task Force teams to "remote" supervisory and analytical duties only in the states where the MoA teams have exhibited sufficient competence. In the states that continue to misrepresent performance presenting hearsay as evidence, the Task Force teams should conduct independent assessments.
- CCMC membership should be re-assessed with Committee members to be selected based on their competencies.

ANNEX 2

Recommendations for strengthening CFSAM data robustness and CCMCs in 2026

- Strengthen the CCMC networks across the country and the online communication capacity of CCMC members.
- Security situation permitting, establish new CCMCs in previously uncovered areas, particularly in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states.
- Provide crop assessment and yield estimation training for selected SMoAs and NGOs staff, including AEAs and CCMCs.
- Increase the use of mobile apps for National Task Force teams and CCMCs to assess the progress of the season and report to FAO/MoAFS Crop Assessment teams in a timely manner.
- The estimation of planted area in the mechanized sector needs to be supported with satellite-based estimation due to the difficulty of measuring areas by Task Force teams and CCMCs on the ground.
- Improve the assessment of planted area, yield and production of crops in commercially-oriented farms, especially in the Greater Equatoria Region.
- Expand the range of the timings of harvest assessments to provide better estimations of disaggregated production of individual crops in each state and county.
- Increase the number of crop cuttings of the main crops, including sorghum, maize, rice, finger millet, pearl millet, cassava, groundnuts and other crops grown in each state and county.

ANNEX 3

Table A3. Counties assessed by the Task Force teams at planting and harvesting times during the 2025 FAO/WFP CFSAM to the Republic of South Sudan

State	Assessment Mission type	Locations (counties visited)	Number of team members	Number of KI interviews	Number of farmer level interviews		Focus group discussions
					Beneficiaries	Non-Beneficiaries	
Western Bahr El Ghazal	Planting	Wau, Jur River, Raja	14	3	85	81	2
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Planting	Aweil West, Aweil East, Aweil Centre, Aweil South	16	4	100	147	4
Warrap	Planting	Gogrial West, Twic, Tonj South, Gogrial East	19	3	51	177	0
Lakes	Planting	Rumbek Centre, Yirol West, Wulu, Cueibet	16	0	0	180	0
Sub total				10	236	585	6
Western Bahr El Ghazal	Main season harvest	Wau, Jur River, Raja	11	5	101	196	4
Northern Bahr El Ghazal	Main season harvest	Aweil Centre, Aweil South, Aweil West, Aweil North, Aweil East	16	5	123	179	7
Warrap	Main season harvest	Tonj south, Gogrial West, Gogrial East, Twic, Tonj North	22	6	22	293	2
Lakes	Main season harvest	Yirol East, Yirol West, Wulu, Cueibet, Rumbek East, Rumbek Centre	16	3	41	337	0
Upper Nile	Main season harvest	Renk, Melut	7	4	63	36	2
Jonglei	Main season harvest	Bor South	4	2	29	31	1
Unity	Main season harvest	RubKona, Guit, Leer	10	5	101	72	2
Sub total				30	480	1 144	18
Western Equatoria	Second season harvest	Yambio, Nzara, Ezo, Ibba, Maridi, Mundri West, Mvolo	25	17	143	273	5
Central Equatoria	Second season harvest	Juba, Terekeka, Yei, Morobo, Lainya	19	5	101	196	4
Eastern Equatoria	Second season harvest	Torit, Ikotos, Lopa/Lafon, Kapoeta South, Kapoeta east, Kapoeta South	25	3	0	278	1
Sub total				25	244	747	10
Grand total				65	960	2 476	34

Note: Some counties located in *bimodal* rainfall areas were assessed three times: during planting, during the first harvest and during the second harvest.

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the data collected during the 2025 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan (CFSAM), 2025.

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SPECIAL REPORT

2025 FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT MISSION (CFSAM) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

Corrigendum

7 April 2026

The following corrections have been made since the publication date 19 March 2026.

Page	Location	Text in published PDF	Text in corrected PDF/ Notes
p. 26	Table 3 (Pibor Administrative Area, Surplus/deficit)	-6 422	-27 287
p. 28	Table 3 (TOTAL, Surplus/deficit)	317 303	-317 303

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